Challenges to the integration of young Muslims in Europe and Spain: strategies and tactics of radical Islamist groups

Desafíos a la integración de jóvenes musulmanes en Europa y España: estrategias y tácticas de grupos radicales islamistas

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Abstract

The study exposes the strategies and tactics of radical Islamism in Europe and Spain to attract and radicalize young Muslims with a religious, media and propagandistic content from Al Qaeda, Daesh or other related organizations that share the culture of jihad; chain of subjects, actions, messages and propaganda to participate in an ideologization process to use violence in the jihad against the West, social and political way of life, and interfere in the democratic, liberal and legal process in Europe.

This qualitative research achieves approximations of individual characteristics and family, social, familiar and economic conditioning factors of the vulnerable groups to the jihadist message, highlighting ignorance or dissolution of their cultural, religious and ritual traditions; absence or weak individual, family or community identity, experience of social, educational, labor or political discrimination and economic inequality; facilitating the radicalization process until their participation in acts of violence.

This research was carried out in the city councils of Fuenlabrada and Leganés, Comunidad de Madrid and Reus and L' Hospitalet de Llobregat, Province of Tarragona, Comunidad de Cataluña, Spain; through specialized bibliography, interviews to academic, police and intelligence experts, public attention and social services workers, the contribution of Muslim community representatives; who observe the emergence of these elements and the need to improve strategies and preventive actions in Europe, reducing its impact on the vulnerable population.

Keywords

Ideology, recruitment, indoctrination, radicalization, terrorism jihadism, religion, State.

Resumen

El estudio expone las estrategias y tácticas del islamismo radical en Europa y España, para captar y radicalizar a jóvenes musulmanes de un contenido religioso, mediático, propagandístico; desde Al Qaeda, Daesh u otras organizaciones afines que comparten la cultura de la yihad; cadena de sujetos, actuaciones, mensajes y propaganda para participar en un proceso de ideologización, para hacer uso de la violencia en la yihad contra Occidente, forma de vida, social y política; e interferir en el proceso democrático, liberal y de derecho en Europa.

Esta investigación cualitativa logra aproximaciones de características individuales y condicionantes familiares, sociales, familiares y económicas de los grupos vulnerables al mensaje yihadista; destacándose ignorancia o disolución de sus tradiciones culturales, religiosas y ritualidad; ausencia o débil identidad individual, familiar o comunitario, experiencia de discriminación social, educativa, laboral o política e inequidad económica; facilitando el proceso de radicalización hasta su participación en actos de violencia indiscriminada.

Esta investigación se realizó en los ayuntamientos de Fuenlabrada y Leganés, Comunidad de Madrid y Reus y L' Hospitalet de Llobregat, Provincia de Tarragona, Comunidad de Cataluña, España; a través de bibliografía especializada, entrevistas a expertos académicos, policiales e inteligencia, trabajadores en atención pública y servicios sociales, el aporte de representantes comunitarios musulmanes; quienes hacen emerger estos elementos y necesidad de mejorar estrategias y actuaciones preventivas en Europa, reduciendo su impacto en la población vulnerable.

Palabras clave

Ideología, captación, adoctrinamiento, radicalización, terrorismo, yihadismo, religión, Estado.

Introduction

The European reconstruction of institutional, political and social infrastructure after the "great war", the parenthesis of "interwar", in which democracy is attacked and disrupted with the emergence of populism, fascism, communism; in its intention to occupy the Western liberal democracies, summoning Europe to a new conflict on the continent and world, with all its consequences, allowing the defeat of fascism; behind it Europe, ruined, divided and deprived population, and isolated between two powers such as the United States of America and the former Soviet Union, which increase the ideolo-

gical and geographical division, a confrontation between Western democracy and Eastern communism. Thus we adopt new terms: "cold war", which lasts for another 35 years until the fall of the eastern bloc [for some today], bringing with it a new integration process, consolidated with the creation and construction of the European Economic Community (Tratado de Roma, 1957), opening the way to economic and political integration to a single and strengthened Europe, bringing a "rapid, drastic and apparently irreversible secularization process" (Casanova, 2012, p. 334), then the European Union, growing with new accessions, deepening of Western liberal democracy, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, promoting mutual trust, welfare, security, justice and citizen participation.

After the chaos and wars, the reconstruction required important internal or external migratory flows from sub-Saharan countries, the Middle East contributing to this human current towards Europe in recovery; individuals and families of political regimes of null or precarious forms of democracy, with little participation and inclusion: cheap labor, contrary to what was expected give way to a permanent stay, aligned in their new destinies, grateful, subdued, invisible, assimilated individuals and families (Toledo 2021, pp. 9-13).

From this new migration, the migrant carries his cultural backpack: tradition, religion and ritual, resorting to it to give continuity to his life, and sometimes collides and frictions with values and ideas accepted and lived in the reception space, opening scenarios of conflicts between native and migrants; that poorly accused give form to xenophobia, rejecting his presence and stay, violence and radicality of the autochthonous in protection to his identity, community and culture, traditions, local economy and even natural resources (Lacomba, 2013, s.p.).

To this reality, the migrant adapts traditions, rituality, individual and community relations to small spaces outside the view of the host community, so that homes and other spaces are transformed into improvised meeting places, cultural symbolism of belonging, language and customs; expressing their decision of help and permanence. For Durkheim (1993), the adaptation of rituality to this social or geographical space is necessary and bearable to "renew certain mental states" (p. 38), promoting adaptation to "practicing the rites that are proper to it", forging unity and solidarity in these recognizable "identical practices" (p. 87), cultural, religious, ritual and/or political, contradictory to the sociocultural reality in the arriving spaces. For Touraine (in Kepel, 1995, p. 107) we identify "religion with tradition and seculariza-

tion with modernity", explaining the eviction from political power, thus any religious visualization and expression in the social sphere challenges this secularization and renewed paradigms, "Europe is intimately linked to a project of cultural modernity that considered religion […] as a vestige of past times" (Bericat, 2008, s.p.), interviewing contempt for all forms of religion, rituality and expressiveness, retracting any action that symbolizes this retrograde traditional order (Touraine en Kepel, 1991, p. 45), Casanova (2012) highlights the idea: "the general secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact" (p. 360).

The European reconstruction: democratic, modern; States, Institutions and society in general, carry new paradigms: distancing between institutionality and religion, moving it from the spheres of power to the individual, according to Casanova (2012), prior to the Treaty of Rome (1957) in detriment of the "institutional Christian religion in Europe" (p. 334), dissipating its transcendence, monopoly, social and political influence.

The effort of political and institutional modernization, collides with other realities; Mediterranean countries, mostly Islamic, exhibit a resurgence of expressiveness and rituality, capturing the political and daily life of its inhabitants; Sarfati (in Peña and Llera, 2013, p.139) explains that "religion experiences a revival on a global scale", vivid in each migrant arriving in Europe, acquiring a "growing public and political identity mobilization, "as a consequence of the intensification of world migratory flows […] or the rise of political Islam", contrary to the current of disdain for religions in Europe.

Ideology, Islamism, and Religious Fundamentalism in Islam

The 1960s expressed the resurgence and strengthening of Islamist movements, according to Borrelli and Saborido (2007, p. 74), the "irruption of Islamist movements in the Arab-Muslim political scene". Ideologues such as Sayyid Qotb, Abul A'la Mawdudi and Ruholla Khomeini claim a political Islam in search of a "cultural, social and fundamentally political identity, against secular nationalist values" (p. 74), until the "establishment of an Islamic state that would carry out the Islamization of society in its entirety [....] 'from above' and then expand throughout the Muslim" (p 74), prior to Western interference.

The great mesh of Islamist groups that represent diverse currents, their differential, lies in the ways in which they intend to carry out the re-Islamization in their communities. To this end, its ideologues have redefined and refocused Islam not only as a religious body but they claim that Islamic society does not only constitute "a gathering of believers", in principle it is "the nature [and source] of political power" in Muslim culture and tradition, as Roy (1996, p. 26) and Borrelli and Saborido say (2007, pp. 4-7). On the one hand, "revolutionaries" defend that this Islamization must come from state power, control or seize the power of the state and promote transformations; another "reformist or moderate", from the social base that leads to an Islamic State, which achieves changes from above, manifested in the political-party activities of 'Muslim Brotherhood' (Egypt). According to Kepel (1991) "it outlines a new historical sequence in which reislamization is carried out above all 'from below', with the impregnation of civil society by the network of mosques and pietist associations" (p. 44), when "the reislamization movements defeated with all their violent confrontations the State" (p. 52).

Added to this current in political Islam is religious fundamentalism, for whom religion is the foundation of individual and community identity. Giddens (2002, p. 705) describes "the approach taken by religious groups that demand the literal application of fundamental texts and believe that the doctrines that emerge from such readings should be applied to all aspects of social, economic and political life": return to religious sources, purify their different currents and promote the literality of the Quran, transverse to other texts such as Torah or the Bible. Religious fundamentalism is a source of primitive ideas: infallible and perfect from God, authority to which no other can invoke and impose itself (Étienne, 1996, pp. 56-59). For Roy (1996, p. 19) this fundamentalism, like radicalism, "designates, in Islam and in general, the eagerness to return and conform to the founding texts of religion", and tries to "ignore all the contributions of history, philosophy and tradition of men".

In turn, radical Islamism is defined as the reposition of religion in the political or the political in the religious, "by its re-reading […] of the history of East and West" (Étienne, 1996, p. 16), especially in the current world order: its religion, culture and community are repressed and displaced, self-perceived pawns of the contemporary world reordering. For this reason, this radical Islamism seeks to recover its sources, spaces and forms of community life, trying to return to the roots of political Islam, which Étienne externalizes as the reconstruction of 'give al-Islam' and discursive "return to the

Islamic precepts of behavior and organization that contain in themselves the solution of contemporary problems" (p. 165).

Islamic religious fundamentalism and political role in its spheres of influence derives from the non-existent division between the spiritual and political, manifested since the origins of Islam: the prophet and founder possesses the duality of religious leader, attains political and military power in life (Bruce, 2003, p. 61). Faced with this, the Umma does not dispense with or need to unfold, which the West recognizes as secular powers, so that its community is referred to as a religious collective and political community at the same time and is unable to recognize itself divided in these areas (Casanova, 2012, p. 94).

This duality is far from the current Catholic and Roman religion, displaced and disempowered; in Islamic culture and tradition, divine omnipresence is manifest in private, public and political life, which Elorza (2002) highlights:

> The only existing law, religious (sharia), is at the same time the civil law of divine origin, which governs all manifestations of human life, both in its individual and social and political aspect [...] the essential thing is that the community adjusts its behavior, and makes the behavior of its members to be adjusted to the provisions of the Creator, thus acquiring an indelible sign of identity. (p. 32)

On the significance of sharia for the Umma, Laroui (2001) argues:

> The šarĭ'a aims to raise man, public and private, to the level of the ethical ideal proposed by the Prophet [...] the regulations base the legality of the State, but the State, if it seeks the title of caliphate, must also look towards the ethical ideal given by the Prophet. (p. 35)

In these precepts, each ruler is a transient recipient of the power delegated by God for his function of governing, and it is the duty of the Umma to obey, to fulfill the tasks set by Allah to his Messenger, depositary of divine power, described in the verse of the emirs (Quran, 9, 71): "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, obey the Envoy and those who hold authority among you" (Elorza, 2002, p. 36).

This religious, political and military conjunction formulates a structuring of the State distant from that adopted by the West, a contradiction that Casanova (2012) exhibits in the Turkish paradox: "a Muslim country more secularist even than the European countries [...] a supposedly secular Europe

is still too Christian when the possibility of imagining a Muslim country as part of the European community approaches" (p. 180), transcendent in the last decade in Europe, witness to the re-Islamizing political process, favoring the Islamist strengthening as a religious and political current in the State; it proves the process of European integration that claims its "right to be, or its right to become, a country fully economically and politically, while it configures his model of Muslim cultural modernity" (p. 290).

Among Islamists more radicalized in their task of erecting their State: the political and religious indissolubility, infallibility of the Quran and Hadiths, sharia as a fundamental law, irrefutable behavior for rulers and ruled, another feature in these fundamentalists, interpret and reinterpret the texts using the past, pure and irrefutable to crystallize the political and religious project today, which brings legitimacy to its religious, political and social objectives, to restore the greatness of Islam from the spiritual and temporal, reIslamicize Muslim society, expand beyond its current borders, topple the current political structures of the States, purification of Islam (Aznar, 2012, pp. 29-31), not abandoning violence as a self-granted prerogative, which Tamayo-Acosta (2009) explains: they are defenders of the 'give al-Islam' or "house of Islam where Muslims rule under Islamic law" (p.169), contrast of the 'give al-hard', territory not subject to Muslim norms, to be conquered and dominated; alleges that in the Quran it is expressed that the war will be over when Muslims triumph over the world, "over non-believers" (p. 169).

For prominent radicalized ideologues, the West and non-Islamic societies, we remain in a "state of religious ignorance that I called yahilliyya" (Borrelli and Saborido, 2007, p. 75), in defiance of the one God Allah, to whom submission and obedience are due, they fight an "Islamic rupture (uzla or mufasada)" to rebuild the "religious order (Din)" (p. 75), reinstate Allah on earth (caliphate) and defeat this "unloyal man" with jihad (p. 75), illustrated with Aristegui (2004) in conversation with the mustegui Umayyad Mosques official photo, Damascus (Syria): "Do not worry about yourself. It will take more or less time, but we will end up liberating all Al-Andalus from Western corruption, decay and oppression" (p. 147), a fraction of the fundamentalist and radicalized message, turned into a cause.

The use of warrior slogans from the Quran justifies the warmongering path cemented through the centuries: "…Community as such must always continue its 'effort' to continue to reign and extend on the earth 'the rights of Allah and of men'" (Aristegui, 2004, p. 165), amalgamating historical and

recent events, political, economic and armed conflicts, able to categorize its space and environment 'us against them', recreating the enemy in 'far / near' categories. This conflicting categorization, 'the West attacks us', 'destroying Islam', 'liberating all Al-Andalus', becomes necessary to entrench the narrative of the overthrow of Muslim society and culture. For Kepel (1995, p. 179) it is exemplified in the Islamist movements of the 80's, "it developed in Algeria as the rejection of a certain political, social and moral order, in the plane of identity, as the affirmation of community belonging to Islam". Thus, Islamist elites forge synergies to entrench the narrative among disillusioned young people until they become radicalized, legitimize the use of violence and defeat the West, reunify the Umma, and establish the universal caliphate.

Interested in these ideologized currents, interpretations and reinterpretations for jihad (struggle for common cause) contained in the revelations of the Quran part of the faith:

> Abû Huraira related that the Prophet (B and P) said: 'God promised the person who fights for His cause, only by faith in Him and His Messengers, to reward him with goods or spoils or to introduce him into Paradise (if he dies). […] I would like to be killed for the cause of God, then rise to be dead and then rise to be dead again.' Hadith Sahîd Al-Bukhari.

For Tamayo-Acosta (2009) 'jihad' is mentioned "thirty-five times in the Quran, most of them followed by the formula 'on the path of the Lord'" (p. 170), connotation of "effort against what is reproved, [...] effort to overcome difficulties" and developed in twenty-two other religious texts of Islam. It refers to "effort or overcoming in one's own and collective [...] on ten occasions, war, but defensive, never offensive" (pp. 170-171), self-defense and strengthening of the individual in the face of the challenges of life; reinterpreted and remodeled, according to Morabia (in Elorza, 2002) to "'holy war' or 'fight for the triumph of faith'", granting them "triple value, warrior, ideological and ethical-social" (p. 40) that radicalized fundamentalists justify in their violence against Shia and minority currents in Islam (near enemy) or against the West, Americans, allies and complicit Muslims (distant enemies), that ideologues are kept to redefine and manipulate.

These redefinitions and categorizations are felt by minority groups who "feel somewhat outraged by the continuing bloodshed [...] and the persistent idea that the West is waging an assault on Islam" (Cano, 2010, p. 78) to destroy their culture, society and religion; drawing concepts and messages for

"the political instrumentalization of the Muslim creed" (p. 24), and Bruce (2003, pp. 31-32). Despite containing a religious connotation, fundamentalist ideology legitimizes the use of violence to impose its vision, regardless of the tradition, culture, ethnicity or religion of those subjected, hence fatwas condemning one or the other to death.

For Roy (2002), violence: "far from representing a religious community, from which they have been marginalized, or a traditional culture, from which they know nothing and which they reject, these new militants show a rupture followed by an individual re-Islamization, in which they build 'their' own Islam" (p. 26), where "neo-fundamentalists" (p. 26) promote the recruitment of followers, groups or "categories product of the modernization of Muslim societies [...] urban and schooled youth", who coexist "declassified [sic]", excluded from social benefits and political participation, subjected to their cultural, economic, family corruption (Roy, 1996, pp. 6–47).

This Western urban youth in predominantly Muslim spaces, that Islamists intervene for "the Islamization of this modernity" (p. 47), neo-fundamentalists sustained in a discourse that instrumentalizes Islam, a risk for the "re-Islamization of Muslim communities emigrated to the West [...] with a relaxed religious practice" (pp. 73-78), inciting them to distance themselves from corruption in the give al-hard, distrust Muslim looseness, create spaces of trust until achieving an unbalanced critical mass in society and "obtain concessions from the state" (Roy, 1996, p. 80), achieve changes towards the peak of power, defeating the secular modern state. He denies any form of religious expressiveness.

Another way, based on a Salafist and bellicose ideology, "combatant" interpretation of jihad, by believing, making believe and deepening that Islam is attacked for its extermination, holding the West and collaborating Muslims responsible, valid at any time, place and objective (Torres, 2009, pp. 112-113). A warlike worldview of aleyas, Medina stage, of "warrior slogans [...] departing from the warmongering path of Islam" (Elorza, 2002, p. 40), surahs such as "Cursed will be wherever they are, they will be picked up and killed mercilessly" (Quran, 33, 61), matured through the centuries in a "bundle of integrism" (p. 40) that becomes from the assimilation of religious and historical facts: the prophet fights against the unloyal; then, in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the expulsion of the crusaders is fought; now a crusade invades the sacred land of Islam. Therefore the asymmetric or terrorist stra-

tegy is not such, but an act of self-defense against the growing imperialism of the West (p. 41).

Engaging, radicalizing, and islamist terrorism

The actions carried out by these Islamist, fundamentalist and radical groups, radicalization that for Rabasa is "the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support or facilitate violence as a method to effect social change" (Rabasa *et al.,* 2010, p. 1), use new technologies; thus, the ideological message, as referred by the European Council, spreads underground and beyond any control throughout the world, basically the fight against a common adversary represented in the West and citizens, USA, Britain and Israel; geographical, cultural and political unit identified with democracy (Azurmendi, 2002, s.p.), "good Muslim" to be in jihad against the "unloyal", enemies of the Koran; extended to every "not innocent" Western citizen, enemy of religion, must sacrifice their blood and patrimony in actions against them (Cano, 2010, p. 25).

According to Del Águila (2008) for fundamentalists their speech is a weapon, and results—death and destruction—a duty; for De la Corte (in Del Águila, 2008), is a "cosmic struggle until the end of time" (p. 83) reinterpreted from "the indiscriminate massacres in religious terms and […] of its lethal and suicidal character as 'proof' of Allah's blessing" (p. 83, own translation), contextualized to the current historical moment: the siege of Palestine by Israel, the late stay on Iraqi soil of the international peacekeepers and even the occupation of Al-Andaluz; thus Berner (2006) explains: "I am one of the worshipers of Allah. I worship Allah, which includes carrying Jihad, to lift up the word of Allah and to drive Americans out of Muslim land" (p. 40).

These adaptations, a constant in the organizational dynamics of Al Qaeda and networks, according to Alvarado (2010) "represent a confederation of entities that share the same jihad culture, characterized by a tribalist [sic], absolutist and messianic world view" (p. 40), which changes with the invasion of Afghanistan by American troops, cutting off its leaders, destruction and expulsion from its bases and territorial sanctuary decimating a first generation of jihadists. This decimated Al Qaeda mutates into an immaterial entity, idea or concept of struggle, incorporated into the minds and hearts of new generations of jihadists, a broad umbrella that is protective, globalized and absolute.

This mutation of Al Qaeda, according to Cano (2010) brings this Jihad closer to "young Muslims belonging to the second and third generation of immigrants residing in Europe" (p. 77), born, raised, educated and socialized; European citizens, for whom Bin Laden is "figure of inspiration" (p. 38) popular, almost romantic in vulnerable social strata, peripheral neighborhoods of European cities, amalgamating 'rigorous' ideological elements of a fundamentalist Islam of Salafist style, and through this, violent jihad, as declared by Bin Laden on September 28, 2001, days after the attacks in New York, as mentioned in Berner (2006)

> Jihad is the sixth undeclared pillar of Islamism. Al Qaeda wants to keep Jihad alive and active and make it part of the daily lives of Muslims. […] We are in favor of armed Jihad against those unloyal governments that kill innocent Muslim men, women and children just for being Muslims. (p. 147)

For Schneckener (Cano, 2010, p. 20), in this act converge transformative elements without precedent in history, imposing a radical Islamist vision, mainly its destructive dimension; impact on human lives and political, economic, media and propaganda; its operation and planning, scope and implementation; international political dimension when attacking the United States revealing its weaknesses. In addition to this black record, Madrid on March 11, 2004 (11M) and London on June 7, 2005 (7J) took advantage of the network to deepen ideological objectives and propaganda, catalyzing the ambitions of the Muslim people, by mobilizing and capturing for their jihad. Madrid, the first European city to suffer an attack by Al Qaeda, not casual in the recovery of the places of Islam; Attack against the Kingdom of Spain, taken and expropriated from the Umma and occupied by the Catholic Monarchs in the fifteenth century, is part of the itinerary to reinstate the universal Caliphate and "Al Andalus" is essential, rescue it from its occupants "Spanish crusaders", according to Torres (2014), responsible for spreading the idea that Spain is built on the "plunder and occupation of a territory that belongs to Islam and its people" (p. 344), which forces them to expel with jihad.

Another strategic guideline provided by ideologues such as Sayid Qutb to enshrine this jihad: the struggle against governments of countries in the Middle East: fictitious, Westernized and geographically delimited, ignoring the reality of the Muslim people to weaken the indivisible and irreplaceable Umma, every leadership and authority in these false countries emanates not from the will of Allah, but from the profane power of the people in the form

of more or less democratic elections, with challenging laws that contravene Allah, without divine legitimization. False states to be eliminated to stop being obstacles in the reunification of the Umma; here these groups:

> They have an inexcusable duty to resort to jihad, with so much more intensity the greater, the threat [...] every effort must be made to destroy the power of the enemies of religion, to wipe out their forces and to secure the roots of religion. (Elorza 2002, p. 157)

In this scenario, the Mujahideen are the front line of this war, rewarded according to the Qur'anic quote: "Let those who change their lives here for the other to fight for Allah! Whoever, fighting for Allah, is killed or victorious, we will give a magnificent reward" (Quran: 4,74). This war, which includes terrorist violence in Europe, is part of the fight against the West, governments and citizens; a blow to European public opinion, aggravating the fear of terrorism against the civilian population (Cano, 2010, p. 33), a threat to the security of the State and Spanish institutions, Al-Andalus territory to be recovered. Thus, Madrid, London, Paris; form the black list of violence, causing serious losses of human, social and material lives, with emotional, psychological, political and economic consequences on victims, families and the European group.

This serious social, political, religious and security conflict, the institutions and civil society, provokes a growing concern, mobilization and effort to restore the trust, security and tranquility of citizens. In return, assuming greater restrictive measures, there is tight international control that manages to weaken and almost suppress its terrorist media presence. However, cornering and encircling Al Qaeda left room for the emergence of a group that continues its jihadist ideology: DAESH (acronym for 'al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq Sham'), popularized as E.I. (Islamic State), supporter and continuator of jihad against the West (Fundéu, 2014, s.p.).

The retreat of Al Qaeda in Europe and empowerment of DAESH, left space to act and recruit young people newly arrived or descendants of previous Muslim migrations; born, raised and educated in Europe, with language skills, socialized in Western culture, access and management of technological and communication resources; typology that emerges after each police action and in Courts of Justice in Spain and Europe, dedicated to recruit Muslim young men and women (Toledo, 2021, pp 11-12).

Europe and Spain, after the acts of jihadist Islamist terrorist violence, from 11M onwards, has updated the punitive rules, that is how all the actions that these groups develop, to date, has a criminal legislative framework, as well as the different behaviors that promote, protect or encourage the use of violence, so there are punishable behaviors of criminal relevance, as well as the criminalization of the glorification of terrorism (art. 578 CP), dissemination of terrorist propaganda (art. 579 CP), passive indoctrination (art. 575.1 CP), self-indoctrination behaviors (art. 575.2 CP), through the Internet, incitement to terrorist violence through the Internet (art. 579.2 CP) or its own glorification of terrorism (art. 578 CP), crimes of more gravity such as collaboration with terrorist organizations (art. 577.1 CP), active indoctrination activities (art. 577.2 CP) or transfer to countries such as Syria or Iraq (art. 575.3 CP) (Cano and Castro, 2018, pp. 14-15), criminally punishable list for the social control of these activities in Spain.

Method: design and methodological research strategies

This research initiates with a literature review, i.e.: to collect literature of reports, research and specialized work, exploration with key words: jihad, Islam, Muslim, terrorism, Al Qaeda, radicalization, ideologization and propaganda, "obligatory step […] [to] get acquainted with the 'state-of-the-art" (Valles, 1997, p. 49), incorporating the knowledge and experiences accumulated from different areas of knowledge. This approach, useful to develop a conceptual framework, operationalize the theoretical concepts in the form of 'Table of Contents' (CualSoft, 2012, s.p.), as for Valles (2004), "has to translate the research questions (objectives, hypotheses, etc.) into questions or conversation with greater or lesser standardization and structuring" (p. 59), first approximations that advance to the construction of the "research questions […] or theory" and then "interview questions" (p. 59), with a description "of terrain" or "explanatory" (p. 59), draft questionnaire that presumably covers all areas.

The control, observation and suggestions to the questionnaire were presented to the "expert or peer judgment" (Pedrosa *et al.,* 2014, p.7), who "evaluate the different items according to their relevance and representativeness" (p.7), assigning not only quantitative assessments, but contributions and analysis of the instrument, recommendations, qualities, absences or unforeseen events.

This methodology uses proposals from the "Glaser and Strauss Grounded Theory" (Trinidad *et al.,* 2006), aiming to provide answers to social research problems; "an approach that proposes a method of analysis, the use of a set of systematically applied techniques" (p. 16), which: "a) is generated and emerges from the field; b) is grounded in the substantive area, and c) develops inductively" (p. 20), allowing the 'emergence' of categories from the data, alternative to the hypothetical-deductive approach in social research (p. 2).

Valles (1997) considers for the success of qualitative research three methodological elements of social research: documentation, observation and conversation (p. 119).

a. Documentary research strategy and literary review

As it is a recent and little studied topic, the review of bibliographical information is timeless, of social impact from academic, national and international institutions and recognized organizations. Thus, their search in specialized libraries, add servers and search engines on the Internet, databases, online catalogs of books, scientific and specialized journals, articles, collective works; audiovisual and photographic archives in the RS, among others. Thus, specialized libraries were used, housed at the Complutense University of Madrid -Faculties of Political Science and Sociology, Law, Social Services, Psychology, Economics and Business and Philology-; of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (Cisde), Alfonso X University, Central Headquarters in Madrid, Pablo de Olavide University, Islamic Library (Aecid), Università di Macerata -Department of Science Politiche della Comunicazione e delle Relazioni Internazionali-, Civil Guard (General Directorate, Headquarters of Garrison Madrid and Academy of Officers of Aranjuez). Documentary and bibliographic collection was not limited to physical spaces, but extended to a global search in servers and specialized search engines on the Internet, records in databases such as: Dialnet, BUCea, Google academic, Miguel de Cervantes Library, SciElo and Scopus. (Toledo 2021, pp. 179–180)

b. Qualitative research technique

b 1. In-depth interviews

Addressed to the interest group, according to Hernández *et al*. (2014) "people, events, communities, etc., on which the data will be collected, without necessarily being representative of the universe or the

population being studied" (p. 562). The difficulties and barriers to access young people in Muslim communities are noted; especially fear, social, community and family environment that prevented any approximation. From this point, the design is reformulated, focusing on the story of experts (academics, professionals, police, in the first line of attention). The target population is defined, according to Valles (2004, p. 27) 'specialized' or 'elites', giving them the importance of the "profit in the political and sociological research of the elites […] important people in certain institutions or organizations".

b 2. Construction of interview tools

We opted for 'in-depth', 'unstructured' interviews with recognized experts, or elites" Valles (2004, p. 31), indicates that the questionnaire helps "translate the research questions (objectives, hypotheses, etc.) into questions or conversation matters with greater or lesser standardization and structuring" (p. 59).

c. Selection of the homogeneous sample of experts and geographical space. One defined the profiles of interest and limited to this list of key characters, they are contacted personally or online, inviting them to participate in the investigation. This contact to key experts allows to increase and extend to others, who based on this recommendation participate. Similarly and consistently to geographical spaces, those non-expert professionals who develop activities with the population at risk, personnel in the front line of attention to communities in their respective municipalities. The participation of social services, and security in the aforementioned municipalities, Guardia Civil, the National Police Corps and Local Police was requested.

These groups of non-professional experts are joined by representatives of the Muslim communities settled and representative in these municipalities. The bibliographic review and contact with experts, allows to place geographically the points considered "important" (population, concentration, police actions, detentions, political activism) (Cano, 2010, pp. 219-224). According to this, neighborhoods were selected in the municipalities of Fuenlabrada and Leganés in the southern periphery of the Community of Madrid and municipalities of Reus and L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Province of Tarragona, Community of Catalonia (Cano and Castro, 2018, p. 20).

Results

The bibliographical experience, added to the story of experts of elites and professionals in the front line of attention and representatives of the proposed communities, allows to approach the actions carried out by radical groups—radicalized fundamentalist Islamists or jihadist Salafists—in their attempt to interfere, intend to undermine to weaken the structures and pillars of the modern and democratic State as the Spanish one, an aspired revolution from below, is how the police Intelligence service expresses: "in addition to their religion they make greater use of politics, where they seek to establish the caliphate, as a theocratic system, where democracy does not exist, without division of powers as we know in the West with democracy, its largest text and way of life is guided by the Koran and the Sharia".

Strategies, tactics and actions by which this ideology expands, often buried, uncontrolled, in spaces permeable to discourse, with affirmation actions for ideologization, physical and/or virtual places in communities within Islam, appearance of closed spaces, without interference from society and the State, 'ghettos'. Each elite expert consulted, expresses thus: "neighborhoods in which groups or communities have been concentrating […] such as Barcelona in which these groups have long dominated neighborhoods, ghettos, areas that are controlled, in which the social life of the community has its areas, its businesses", in the outskirts of large cities, from there trying to undermine, destroy and transform a democratic and social State a caliphal form of state for a single and irreplaceable Umma, which a Civil Guard Investigation team details: "the greater incidence of the probability of separation […] when its approaches and postulates are not accepted […] it chooses to retire and separate and will go to spaces for worship, less exposed to the public."

The jihadist, fundamentalist, Salafist and bellicose ideology is incubated since the beginning of Islam, its founding texts —Koran and Sharia—. Life and work of the Prophet Muhammad, inspires contemporary thinkers of Islam, ideological germ of groups such as Al Qaeda, Daesh and others, which tuck in and coalesce violence, seeking to achieve changes to return to the sources of Islam, rebuild the Umma and world caliphate, land of Dar Al-Islam.

Organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh and related groups in this culture of jihad and violence, through tendentious manipulations and simplification of Islam, urge to carry out a jihad against the West, culture, society, democracy and citizens; to return and reoccupy geographical spaces from

where they have been expelled, Afghanistan, is an example of this situation, creating communication channels to spread their ideals, unify discourse, action and patterns of behavior, among other jihad, confirming messages of hatred, content and reaffirmation actions to their followers scattered around the world, reaffirming in the imagination of these small groups the just revenge, recreating the image of the 'distant or close enemy'; identifiable, persecutable by their attack on Islam, culture, politics, countries and communities; uniting to act against this enemy, making permanent the 'jihad of the open front'. In this story, Spain is a distant enemy: aggressor, usurper and plunderer, against which to fight until his expulsion from *Al-Andalus* to rebuild the Caliphate and Umma, as expressed in part of his propaganda of image 1.

Image 1
*Propaganda in the jihadist narrative*

Note. Inspire, Fall 1431/2010, p. 21

In this diffusion there is no single message or religious content, Islam is omnipresent; it encompasses the forms of daily life of men and women in their community, propaganda and media are dedicated to reject social, community and political life in the West, interfering in the Muslim participation of any form of democracy; prior to establishing a political system other than the democratic State in giving al-hard, Islamist State that structures a new public and private coexistence of their communities, rejecting and expelling other forms of life, religion and culture of giving al-Islam, deepening the hatred towards those who do not think or act the same as the 'good Muslims', so the close enemy is persecuted, repudiated and jihad, which expresses the reading of this speech of image 2.

Image 2

Propaganda incites democracy replacement

La plataforma declarada del grupo francés Jama'at Al-Tawhid es representativa desde esta perspectiva general: "Nuestro mensaje al gobierno francés y de cualquier otra [institución que se rige por] la ley creada por el hombre es que los musulmanes de todo el mundo sólo se someterán a Alá (swt) y creerán que es un crimen y un acto de apostasía el obedecer una ley creada por el hombre, [tal como] la ley francesa.

"Los dos sistemas de secularismo e Islam están opuestos: no se puede decir que la soberanía y la supremacía le pertenecen al hombre, por un lado y que la soberanía le pertenece a Alá por el otro, debemos tener prioridad y [la prioridad] va hacia el Islam.

"Los musulmanes deben creer que el Islam dominara Francia y reemplazará la constitución del gobierno francés por el *Sharia*".

Note. https://islamenmurcia.blogspot.com/2011/08/

These strategic changes and dissemination performance have varied in form, format and content; together with technological advances and digitalization, the spread of radical ideas is increased, broadened, deepened and extended without intermediaries or risk to its target audience, with the intensive use of physical and now virtual media; Internet and other technological tools relentlessly disseminate images, audios and writings, as shown in image 3 of Inspire, magazine for the dissemination of its propaganda; shared, debated and participated by radicalized followers, emphasizing the dramatism, harmfulness and victimhood posed by the Western, common and concrete enemy, undermining the citizen coexistence in freedom, opinion and cooperation; inducing social distancing where it is settled, in European cities; ghettos, expression of isolation and distancing from the host society, as presented in Inspire, image 4.

Image 3

Story against democracy and participation

We'll have no part in the democracy and elections. We'll carry on the fight and we'll never negotiate. I wear clothes of explosives, I'm heading out to kill disbelievers. I'm a martyr, I'm an earthquake that shakes the palace built on pride. [Mohammed Younis Jihad Mal, Taliban singer]

Note. Inspire Magazine. 2010 edition, p. 5

Image 4

Account for inciting jihad

They should strive to follow the command of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ who warned Muslims from living amongst non-Muslims. They should either immigrate or fight Jihad in the West by individual Jihad or by communicating with their brothers in the lands of Jihad.

Note. Inspire in 2010 edition, p. 5

These forms of propaganda and content decay in physical spaces: formal or informal mosques, community centers, shops under tight judicial and police control, so the Internet, SS, chats and blogs find material: videos, audios

or magazines, which allow the uninterrupted connection between radicalized people, who access easily, safely, permanently, interactively and participatively; start to recruit, capture and radicalize until jihadization, and Inspire provides the media to followers, as shown in images 5 and 6.

Image 5
Interaction with followers

Note. Inspire, March 2010 edition. s/p.

Image 6
Interaction with followers

Note. Inspire, March 2010 edition. s/p.

It was pointed out that Al Qaeda is the expansion and deepening of the jihadist Salafi ideology, diminished after the action of national and international countries and institutions, while Daesh grows, adopts and rivals its discourse, objective and strategies for jihad; its tactics change, distancing itself from large objectives, focusing on tactics of individual terrorism, small coups, few resources; *homegrown terrorist*, lone wolf or *self-terrorist* modality, mostly online radicalization, highlighting the attractiveness among young people: catalyzed by means of "ongoing conflicts […] especially the conflict in Syria", guiding them to be active in a cause against infidels, apostates and heretics, "radicalized in ideology Jihadist Salafism".

This tactical turn causes the group cell to be replaced by a simple and basic one: the self-radicalized individual, without a clear profile, especially vulnerable and permeable to these messages, contents and affirmative actions; and the consulted elite expert expresses young people are very exposed to jihadist propaganda and a message that tells them how to act, think, live together and live their spirituality, which carries from their family, a history of no or little access to formal or informal education, high rates of illiteracy, dropout and school failure, and other shortcomings that are highlighted: what happens to the third generation?, new Europeans who have been born in a society that they do not recognize, with life experiences very distant from the culture that live at home, detached from their origins, and traditions; hardly revived at home; worsening their perception of "a Europe that is in a state of collapse, that is impoverished", where socio-economic-political gaps increase, exposed to xenophobic attitudes and subtle forms of discrimination. A geopolitical space that gives neither future nor work […] to young people born here or wherever, frustrated in the personal, family: disenchanted European citizens who manage the mother tongue and host, presumably adapted and inserted in their western community, undetectable to the police, outside any type of social, family or community control; lone wolves who sacrifice themselves for the emulation of a friend, family or other member of the network, their fight is revenge against a system that has been displaced, is invisible and forgotten.

In this chain of inciting and radicalizing actors, there is a possible link, the imam himself in his mosque (formal or informal), social centers; subjects with dowries and access to these spaces of great value, this situation is highlighted by one of the elite consultations, who highlights their importance as "radicalization agents in Europe", with the example of "United Kingdom", in whose reality these charismatic individuals are "the preachers in the mosques themselves […] a fundamental or propagandistic agent of radicalization", aggravated by the transcendence of imam in their culture and socialization, a powerful expression that reaffirms the content of the message and the actions that are promoted. In the Spanish case, "preachers have not been as important as charismatic activists […], the main agents of radicalization."

Others, jihadists returned to prisons or family homes. What is relevant in these individuals: charisma, observation and persuasion to probe the mood of the individual; ability to interpret at their convenience, religious texts and ideas that justify jihad, encouraging the consumption of propaganda; an em-

pathetic and persuasive discourse, isolating the captured from their community and host environment, getting the radicalizing, fundamentalist, bellicose, anti-Western and hate message, penetrate and take root, taking advantage of off-line or online spaces of the network; assuming fundamentalist, radical and violent ideas; thus, their world and interrelations are seeing from the prism of Islam, and from this prism with a often simplified interpretation they live it from a confrontation between Islam and Christianity, defenders of the laws of Allah, nothing with the intensive use of propaganda: they are seeing it on the Internet, reinforcing the indoctrination and ideologization and recent exploitation by jihadist networks, energizing the captured or group in recreating new identities and links; raising motivations in seeking new horizons, offering meaning to their lives: participating in a world project, framed as religious and moral, convinced in the legitimization of their acts.

In this transition towards jihadization, facilitators and chain of actors intensify the use of compendia, quotations and excerpts of Quranic lyrics, verses and hadiths, overexposing the Sharia and Sunnah, self-serving and justifying reinterpretations of Allah's purpose and mandate without countervailing arguments; what Eurogroup expects: "limited pseudo-religious arguments, intentional and severed arguments from the sacred texts of Islam, a crude manipulation of religious content to be used and internalized in these groups", to "exploit them [...] within a regrettable successful process of radicalization around these ideas and achieve an excessive link of jihadist terrorist type".

In the opinion of the experts, beyond describing a specific profile of the vulnerable individual: "it is not that there is no profile, it is that there are many", refuting the definition of profile itself, hindering any attempt to approach "both to understand the phenomenon and to try to apply it to the current reality", making it difficult to prevent or control it formally and informally; the idea of a profile is a constant among the media, community and groups with xenophobic discourses.

In the family, individual socialized in a patriarchal traditionalist model, zero or low level of schooling of their parents, unable to share an appropriate religious knowledge, traditions and Muslim rituality, hindering cultural, religious transmission and community coexistence: "the father reaches a level that can not have on him, a force to locate him, to guide him, to draw his map or road map".

Socially, they live and coexist in precarious conditions or close to it, without access to housing, cohabiting in small and overcrowded spaces, says

one of the respondents; "We have indeed detected that there are homes in which five and six families live. […] a problem of marginalization, of coexistence."

On the other hand, these young people participate in community spaces permeable to actions of radicalism and religious fundamentalism, which progressively lead to a segregationist message, preventing them from being participants in the host community, spreading anti-Western expressive actions, such as the rejection of the democratic state, altering coexistence with the host community, transposing a rigorous and fundamentalist Islam, "complex areas, with a majority of immigrant, there are cultural and religion differences that create a parallel world." Thus, in the geography of the city, ghettos, parallel societies, expression of isolation and distancing of this minority proliferate, eliminating any possibility of contact and integration with the host community; taken advantage of networks so that its message, strengthened in propaganda, penetrates. Ghettos of poor, jobless, displaced, forgotten people, cohabiting in a religious, fervent and intolerant subculture.

In the labor market, restricted access to the labor market: low-skilled, temporary and low-paid jobs; in the economic, recurrent in social aid, those who perform this first care, describe that "with a curriculum and considerable training they are not able to access jobs offered", however, the feeling spreads "I am here by necessity. But I do not ask for anything: I do not want help. We have no right to ask for anything. We are foreigners. They look at us differently. We will always be foreigners here," they emphasize.

This benefits any form of radicalization, in our religious case; especially pre-adolescent males, adolescents and, to a lesser degree, young adults. However, there are minority opinions that point out that recruitment for radicalization can occur in any environment and social class.

Conclusions and discussion

The person who is captured, individual to radicalize: vulnerable to a psychosocial situation of failure, emotional immaturity, school failure, job marginalization, real or perceived uprooting, lack of integration, and frustration in their present and future expectations; without a sense of belonging; loss of the experiential thread of their predecessors (parents, grandparents); absence or weak individual or social identity; reduction of their family, religious traditions and rituality, social and cultural; uprooting, victim between

two cultures (of parents and foster care); experience and experience of discrimination by their religion, culture and modus vivendi.

The arrival and penetration of communications technology allows jihadist leaders, charismatic recruiters and the same terrorist network, a strategic change, transferring their speeches and performances from a physical environment to a virtual, anonymous and secure one. The anonymity, durability and transcendence of the message, repercussion and breadth of the content, entails greater geographical dissemination among followers.

Acting through the Internet has meant a quantitative and qualitative leap in the preparation, diffusion and *feedback* of propaganda designed to capture, essential in the socialization and jihadist irruption; internal communication, coordination and unification of the message, *modus operandi* and reinforcement, operational learning and counterintelligence. To a large extent the struggles and battles have moved from the physical to the virtual, waging there the new battles in the new wars.

In every revolt in the center or outskirts of Paris, Brussels or other European capitals and cities; in every space where vulnerable communities live, the discourse and reaffirmation actions are strengthened and explicit, where the State, services, agents are not able to enter; ghettos where the norms of a rigorous, fundamentalist and radical Islam prevail over the basic rules of life in liberal democracy, the actions of radical groups weaken the rule of law, and the ideologization of young Europeans for jihad is one of the symptoms of this regression.

Given the sense and phenomenon of radicalization in Islam by young Europeans, high social impact in Europe and Spain for its lethal effects on society and European population; facts of investigative interest are criminal offenses in Spain, which influenced the refusal of participation of a representative sample of the target population, having to adapt the design of research for inaccessibility to individuals of interest, limiting expectations and results.

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