REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y HUMANAS XXI
NIVERSITAS

https://doi.org/10.17163/uni.n44.2026.08

Disinformation and artificial intelligence in political discourse: Use of generative AI in the Parliament of Galicia (Spain)

Desinformación e inteligencia artificial en el discurso político: uso de IA generativa en el Parlamento de Galicia (España)

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Received on: 10/10/2025 **Revised on:** 25/11/2025 **Approved on:** 8/02/2026 **Published on:** 01/03/2026

Suggested citation: Puentes-Rivera, I., Fernández-Souto, A. B. and Vázquez-Gestal, M. (2026). Disinformation and artificial intelligence in political discourse: Use of generative AI in the Parliament of Galicia (Spain). *Universitas XXI, 44*, pp. 197-222. https://doi.org/10.17163/uni.n44.2026.08

Abstract

The emergence of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools poses challenges, ethical and moral dilemmas, the need for new regulatory frameworks, and the implementation of novel work routines, especially in the field of political and institutional communication. This article conducts an exploratory study on the use and application of these tools by members of the Parliament of Galicia (Spain). Its objectives include determining the degree of use, identifying the most frequently used tools, their main advantages and disadvantages, the parliamentary tasks in which they are most frequently used, identifying possible differences between ideological tendencies, and relating their use to the phenomenon of disinformation. To this end, a bibliographic review was carried out and the initial hypotheses were compared with the responses to an online questionnaire sent to the 75 members of the Galician Parliament and with the results of the analysis using ChatGPT and GPTZero to a sample of various initiatives from all parliamentary groups, those discussed in the plenary sessions of June 2025, in order to determine the percentage of AI-generated text and disinformation present in that sample. The results and conclusions show the widespread use of AI in the Galician legislative chamber, but at low percentages and with ethical limits that consist of using it only as a basis for work that has fundamentally human control and contribution. The members of parliament, in addition to using this tool, are generally in favor of its regulation, demand more specific training on the subject, and ChatGPT is the dominant software, with the use of other AI tools being anecdotal.

Keywords

Generative artificial intelligence, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, disinformation, speech, politics, parliament, Galicia

Resumen

La irrupción de herramientas de inteligencia artificial (IA) generativa plantea retos, dilemas éticos y morales, necesidades de nuevos marcos regulatorios e implementación de novedosas rutinas de trabajo, especialmente en el ámbito de la comunicación política e institucional. Este artículo realiza un estudio exploratorio sobre el uso y aplicaciones de estas herramientas por parte de los diputados/as del Parlamento de Galicia (España), destacando entre sus objetivos determinar el grado de uso, identificar las más utilizadas, las principales ventajas e inconvenientes, las labores parlamentarias en las que más se emplean, hallar posibles diferencias entre tendencias ideológicas y relacionar su uso con el fenómeno de la desinformación. Para ello se llevó a cabo una revisión bibliográfica y se contrastaron las hipótesis de partida con las respuestas de un cuestionario online remitido a los 75 diputados/as del Parlamento gallego y con los resultados del análisis mediante ChatGPT y GPTZero al que fue sometida una muestra de diversas iniciativas de todos los grupos parlamentarios, las tratadas en los plenos del mes de junio de 2025, a fin de determinar el porcentaje de texto generado por IA y de desinformación presente en esa muestra. Los resultados y conclusiones evidencian el uso generalizado de la IA en la cámara legislativa gallega, pero en porcentajes bajos y con unos límites éticos que consisten en recurrir a ella únicamente como base de un trabajo que cuenta con un control y una aportación fundamentalmente humana. Los diputados/as, además de utilizar esta herramienta, se muestran favorables, en general, a su regularización, reclaman más formación específica en la materia y es ChatGPT el software dominante, siendo anecdótico el uso de otras herramientas de IA.

Palabras clave

Inteligencia artificial generativa, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, desinformación, discurso, política, parlamento, Galicia.

Introduction and state-of-the-art

Although there are many large language models (LLMs), ChatGPT, developed in the US, is one of the most visible and widely used, while DeepSeek is a more recent variant. ChatGPT was launched in 2022 and reached 100 million monthly users in just two months (Baum and Villasenor, 2023). DeepSeek is a similar model, introduced in 2025, but more restricted in some institutional and governmental environments due to fears that its links to the government of the People's Republic of China generate in some states from a national security perspective (Deepes, 2025). Both systems were designed to generate coherent and contextual text, capable of supporting everything from speech writing to automated responses (Foos, 2024).

Since its launch in November 2022, ChatGPT has been the subject of multiple academic studies and research in the field of social sciences. Between November 2022 and April 2023, 156 publications indexed in Scopus were verified on this tool, and more than 4,600 throughout 2023, with more than 2,600 in the first months of 2024 (Marino and Giglietto, 2024), giving an idea of the massive interest in its application to discourse analysis, social experiments, and digital surveys, among other uses.

For its part, DeepSeek, the AI model developed in China, has been the subject of study in journals such as Nature (Conroy and Mallapaty, 2025), focusing in this case more on scientific production, as noted, than on its geopolitical impact. Some official documents and research, mainly from the United States, highlight concerns about DeepSeek in relation to the illegal extraction of knowledge from OpenAI, the company that developed ChatGPT, automated censorship, and the transfer of sensitive data to infrastructures associated with the Chinese government (United States Congress, 2025; Mok, 2025). In any case, there is also a line of research that highlights the advantages of DeepSeek from the point of view of democratizing global access to advanced AI (Baydemir, 2025).

Disinformation, artificial intelligence, and political discourse

Disinformation has established itself as a global threat to the integrity of public debate and democracy (Csernatoni, 2024), especially with the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and generative models, which allow false information to be produced and amplified on a large scale and with high persuasive-

ness. In particular, it has been observed that large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, can flood media and social spaces with content that blurs the line between reality and *ad hoc* fabrication, eroding public trust (Kreps and Kriner, 2024).

Authors such as López Borrull and Lopezosa (2025) analyze 64 academic studies published between 2021 and 2024 on this subject and confirm the ambivalent nature of generative AI (GAI), which can both disseminate disinformation and offer tools to detect it, identifying six key areas: political, educational, and scientific disinformation; automated fact checking; media literacy, and deepfakes. For their part, Raman *et al.* (2024) conduct an analysis of nearly 10,000 publications between 2013 and 2022, showing how fake news linked to generative AI has escalated significantly in recent years, highlighting the need for studies focused on automated verification and digital ethics.

Due to its nature as a guarantor of informed public opinion, an essential pillar of any real democracy, it is in the field of political communication, together with the media, where these risks and debates are most evident. In the political arena, communication has also evolved to include sophisticated microtargeting strategies and the generation of personalized content using AI, with a clear risk of erosion of trust and democratic representation due to the massive generation of misleading content (Kreps and Kriner, 2024). Recent studies show that ChatGPT and other models can skew debates toward particular positions, especially when they know the audience's demographics, becoming more persuasive than humans themselves; a level of persuasion that poses obvious risks of information manipulation and polarization (Davis, 2025).

The ability to generate highly personalized messages using AI makes it possible to design political discourse that appeals to the specific beliefs of the target audience, increasing its persuasive effect. Generative models can produce hallucinations (coherent but false information) which, without adequate human supervision, can introduce factual errors into AI-generated political discourse. In addition, certain studies identify implicit political biases in the responses of these models, which could influence the content generated for parliaments or institutional cabinets (Motoki *et al.,* 2025).

The emergence of generative artificial intelligence is therefore redefining the production and transmission of political discourse. These technologies make it possible to generate persuasive, personalized, and mass textual

content, which creates new risks of intentional or accidental misinformation, compounded by the ability of generative models to increase the volume and quality of false or misleading content.

However, authors such as Simon *et al*. (2023) frame these concerns about AI as "an old and broad family of moral panics surrounding new technologies" and argue that the impact on the actual consumption of disinformation could be more limited than expected, as demand does not necessarily increase with supply and most users continue to consume media content, filtered by professional routines and content curation.

On the positive side of AI, even using it to combat disinformation, initiatives such as Full Fact (fullfact.org), NewsGuard (newsguardtech.com), and tools promoted by European projects such as REVEAL (revealdata.com), AI4TRUST (cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101070190), and VERA.ai (veraai.eu), which use AI to detect, classify, and track false narratives in real time. This dual capacity to generate but also detect false content underscores the need for contextual approaches and human oversight, using AI as an aid or tool, but with ultimately rational control.

In this regard, opinion polls such as the one conducted among the Andalusian population and referenced by Garriga *et al.* (2024) show that, although 86% of citizens believe that AI facilitates the production of fake news, 54% believe that it can also help combat it, leaving the door open for citizen support for hybrid models of surveillance and automated verification (automated *f*act checking), always accompanied by human supervision.

In the political sphere, some studies also explore how journalists and political actors use generative models to write speeches, announcements, or social media content. Simon *et al.* (2023) highlight how institutional media and election campaigns could increase the speed and scale of distribution of false messages, although they also benefit from AI in the production of truthful content. For these authors, many concerns about AI are speculative and not supported by solid empirical evidence. It would therefore be more realistic to focus attention on strengthening the information ecosystem by reinforcing journalistic institutions, digital literacy, and adequate regulation of these technologies than to simply combat them head-on.

In this regard, it should be noted that in December 2024, the Consello da Xunta de Galicia, the executive body of the Galician regional government, approved the Draft Law for the Development and Promotion of AI in Galicia, becoming the first European region to promote specific legislation on arti-

ficial intelligence (Xunta de Galicia, 2024). This bill, which became law on April 24, 2025 (DOG, 2025), does not explicitly mention ChatGPT or other LLMs, nor does it directly address the automated generation of political content, but it establishes the implementation of mechanisms for assessing the impact on fundamental rights, human-controlled supervisory offices, mandatory reporting, application of the principle of transparency, and a public registry of AI systems used by the administration, in addition to the creation of an AI Commissioner. All these elements provide a robust institutional framework for demanding transparency in public communications generated by AI, including those emanating from the Galician Parliament and other institutions. All of this reveals an institutional willingness to avoid the risks of automated generation of unverified text, which has direct implications for future parliamentary applications and political communication in general, recognizing the disruptive power of language models such as ChatGPT and seeking to avoid their indiscriminate use, which could lead to unverified discourse or discursive manipulation.

In summary, we could synthesize the impact of generative artificial intelligence on political discourse in the following aspects:

1. Increased production volume and better personalization or individualization of audiences: AI makes it possible to produce messages that are highly tailored to the audience and reproduce them on a large scale, which can amplify the persuasiveness of misleading messages.

2. Unintentional errors and biases: without human supervision, models may include incorrect or ideologically biased information.

3. Counterbalance through AI applied to verification: advanced tools already exist to classify and curb disinformation, although they require greater institutional support.

4. Need for ethical application in political discourse: Political parties, cabinets, and public institutions can use AI as an aid in drafting and creating different materials, but this requires the development and application of ethical and transparency standards.

5. Need for empirical evidence and specific regulation: excessive fear of the impact of AI-based technologies must be balanced with effective public policies and critical studies that consider the risks, but also the benefits, of using artificial intelligence in political discourse and debate.

Use of artificial intelligence in parliamentary politics and communications offices

More than 20 parliaments around the world—including the European Parliament and those of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, and Italy—are researching or implementing the use of artificial intelligence for parliamentary assistance purposes (IPU, 2024). These applications include, among others, text generation, automated analysis of speeches or transcripts, and support for citizen consultations.

In the specific case of parliaments, studies such as that by Evkoski and Pollak (2023) demonstrate how language models can be used to analyze and predict political leanings in parliamentary speeches through explainable machine learning. Other recent research analyzes how ChatGPT can exhibit political biases and a misalignment with prevailing social values, often rejecting the generation of certain content and tending to represent perspectives considered mainstream (Motoki *et al.,* 2025).

This is particularly relevant in parliamentary contexts, where extensive language models could contribute to automating and standardizing speeches, questions, and answers, to the detriment of ideological pluralism.

In the specific case of Spain, there are few studies related to disinformation in local, regional, or autonomous contexts, and of those that do exist, a significant number focus on episodes of disinformation linked to specific political contexts such as the independence process in Catalonia (Aparici *et al.,* 2019), specific elections (Rivas-de-Roca *et al.,* 2022), practices and routines in institutional communication offices (Vázquez-Gestal *et al.,* 2024), or general research on disinformation studies in Spain (Rúas-Araújo and Paniagua-Rojano, 2023; Morais and Piñeiro, 2025). No research focused on the application of AI tools to parliamentary discourse and work has been found in the scientific output analyzed. In this sense, the present study is pioneering, opening up a line of research in the field of regional parliaments. Only one publication by the Madrid Assembly is worth mentioning, which, among other aspects, reflects on "legal certainty in the use of AI in the parliament" (De Alba Bastarrechea, 2025).

In the institutional sphere, many communications offices have incorporated AI into their daily work routines to, among other tasks, draft press releases, prepare responses to the press, generate news summaries and talking points, and monitor social media in real time. There is global evidence of its regular use in

political campaigns and institutional press offices of all kinds (López Borrull and Lopezosa, 2025), with generative AI being used to draft campaign emails, advertisements, and speeches (Foos, 2024). Similarly, in the scientific field, projects developed by journalists and data researchers have combined ChatGPT with human work to analyze political rhetoric (Troboukis *et al.,* 2024).

There are no studies on the use of generative AI in public institutions or institutional communication offices in the autonomous community of Galicia. However, it is worth noting, indirectly, the implementation of educational campaigns such as AulaCheck, promoted by the Xunta de Galicia and FECYT: Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (Xunta de Galicia, 2024), which would implicitly demonstrate a concern or awareness of combating hoaxes using artificial intelligence-based tools and promoting critical thinking among Galician students, as well as institutional awareness of the risks of AI in public discourse.

To date, there are also no formally indexed publications with direct interviews with Galician MPs on the use of ChatGPT or AI in their work. However, useful and revealing statements of intent can be gleaned from interviews with experts in the media and from the institutional Declaration in favor of ethical and human-centered development in Galicia (Galician Parliament, 2022). Thus, in a televised interview, Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras, an AI expert at the European Commission, emphasizes the importance of oversight and transparency in the parliamentary use of AI to prevent the spread of fake news (RTVE, 2023); In her speech before the Joint Committee on National Security of the Spanish Parliament, she pointed out that generative artificial intelligence can influence legislative deliberation, a risk that could clearly be extrapolated to the Galician Parliament.

In relation to the aforementioned institutional declaration of the Galician Parliament, the joint support, whether explicit or implicit, of all groups demonstrates a shared commitment by the different members of parliament to the need for oversight and quality in the use of automated parliamentary drafting tools, in line with European guidelines on this matter. Although cases of disinformation are not directly addressed, this regulatory provision suggests a context that anticipates communication problems arising from the use of unregulated AI.

Finally, it should be noted that the literature on social media in Spain points out that political groups such as VOX use their social media profiles to spread polarized discourse based on disinformation and manipulation strategies (Teruel and García, 2025; Olmos, 2023). In the case of Galicia, these dynamics could

take specific forms in campaigns linked to immigration or gender, in line with patterns also observed internationally (Díaz *et al*., 2023). There are numerous viral cases of politicians using highly generative discourse in viral messages on their social media, which then called into question the human authorship of the content. These dynamics could be replicated in the Galician context.

Ethical and moral limits on the use of artificial intelligence

The use of AI in politics undoubtedly raises ethical dilemmas related to transparency, content responsibility, data privacy, ideological bias, reduction of political pluralism, and fairness, among others (Kreps and Kriner, 2024; Baum and Villasenor, 2023). Furthermore, most existing ethical frameworks lack binding mechanisms, which limits their actual effectiveness to the willingness of each individual.

Within the European Union, common regulatory frameworks, such as the Artificial Intelligence Act (Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea, 2024) and the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (Comisión Europea, 2022), promote obligations of transparency, detection of AI-generated content, labeling, and accountability. However, compliance and effective adherence by Member States remain a challenge and an ambitious goal yet to be effectively achieved (Csernatoni, 2024).

Accordingly, the ethical limits on AI, and in particular on its application in the political and institutional sphere, revolve around three key areas:

1. Transparency and accountability: the current lack of clarity and adequate tools to determine unequivocally whether a message was generated by AI undermines communicative accountability (Yip and Balagué, 2023).

2. Privacy and data sovereignty: DeepSeek, for example, raises dilemmas of cross-border transfer, geopolitical security, and possible violation of the GDPR: EU General Data Protection Regulation (Mok, 2025).

3. Ideological neutrality: to the extent that AI opts for more generalist and mainstream content, it shies away from certain more alternative or minority content from a social and electoral point of view, which may restrict parliamentary deliberation and ideological pluralism (Motoki *et al.,* 2025).

In the specific case of Galicia, the aforementioned Institutional Declaration in favor of ethical and human-centered development in Galicia (Parla-

mento de Galicia, 2022) reveals the position of the parliamentary groups (PP, BNG, and PSdeG-PSOE) in favor of values such as respect for fundamental rights and citizen governance. This establishes, on paper, unanimously shared ethical limits to restrict the use of generative AI in political discourse without human supervision or adequate transparency.

Materials and methods

Objectives and hypotheses

The research underlying this article is based on the general objective (GO) of analyzing the use of artificial intelligence in parliamentary work and its possible relationship with disinformation. This general objective is broken down into the following specific objectives:

SO1: to determine the extent of AI use in this field.
SO2: to identify the most widely used AI tools in the Galician Parliament.
SO3: to ascertain the main advantages and disadvantages of its use.
SO4: The parliamentary tasks in which it is most widely used.
SO5: Find possible differences between ideological trends.
SO6: Relate its use to the phenomenon of disinformation.

The initial hypotheses include:

H1: Generative AI, such as ChatGPT or DeepSeek, has already become a common working tool in parliaments.
H2: Parliaments, including that of Galicia, are adopting generative AI as a tool for generating texts and speeches.
H3: Members of Parliament do not generally acknowledge its use.
H4: This is done in an unplanned and unprofessional manner.
H5: The use of AI may result in a higher level of misinformation.

Method

A mixed methodology based on qualitative and quantitative techniques was used to carry out this research. First, a literature review was carried out with the help of artificial intelligence, using the paid version of ChatGPT

offered by the University of Vigo to its research staff (ChatGPT Plus 5), in order to obtain a more comprehensive overview of the main references related to the subject of study, which were subsequently reviewed and verified by the authors.

Secondly, in order to verify the results of this newspaper archive review and to obtain a better understanding of the subject of study, together with higher quality results and conclusions, a methodological triangulation was chosen, which included an online questionnaire with 25 questions, sent to the 75 members of the Galician Parliament in July 2025,[1] 12 responses were obtained, representing 16% of the total. This was combined with an analysis of all written initiatives (bills, non-legislative proposals, questions, and interpellations) that the four parliamentary groups (PP: Partido Popular, BNG: Bloque Nacionalista Galego, PSdeG-PSOE: Galician Socialist Party, and DO: Democracia Ourensana, the latter integrated into the Mixed Group) discussed in the two plenary sessions in June 2025 (June 10-11 and 24-25), extracted from the agenda available on the Galician Parliament's website (parlamentodegalicia.gal). This documentation was subjected to a double analysis. On the one hand, the percentage probability that these documents included text generated with AI assistance was calculated using ChatGPT from the University of Vigo and GPTZero software (app.gptzero.me). On the other hand, the level of disinformation present in the same texts was found with the help of ChatGPT. It should be noted that, although these two tools are not scientifically validated for this purpose, the exploratory nature of the study and its focus on AI suggest that it is appropriate to use them to test how they can contribute to this.

The use of GPTZero stems, in any case, from a query made to ChatGPT about suitable programs for calculating AI-generated text and, above all, from consulting specialized sources (Fernández, 2025).

Finally, the results obtained by the different methods were compared, and the conclusions presented in the corresponding section were drawn.

1 Online questionnaire available at https://forms.gle/SZMqmqG6evrgLvEW6

Table 1
Sample obtained for the study

Variable	Percentage
Gender	
Age	
Location Ideological: between 1 (most left-wing) and 10 (most right)	

Analysis and results

Online questionnaire administered to members of the Galician Parliament on their use of generative AI

The first thing to note is that there are no significant differences in relation to the use of generative AI based on gender or age group: both men and women, as well as younger and older members of parliament, report cases of both use and rejection of this technology. Nor are there any differences from an ideological point of view, as there are cases of use and non-use on both the left and right of the parliamentary spectrum. However, it should be noted that the questionnaire was answered mainly by members of parliament from the far left and center-left.

ChatGPT is by far the most widely identified generative AI tool (100%), followed by Meta AI, linked to WhatsApp (58%), and DeepSeek (42%), but of the 21 suggested in the questionnaire, up to ten different ones are identified. Regarding the use of AI in their parliamentary work, 33% of members of parliament say they never use it, compared to twice as many, 66%, who admit to using it regularly, mostly (86%) in free versions. ChatGPT is the most commonly used tool (42%), followed by Qwen (17%) and Microsoft Copilot (8%). It is noteworthy that DeepSeek is not used at all (0%). In any case, regardless of regular use, 100% of members of parliament admit to having used generative AI at some point, mainly ChatGPT (92%), Meta AI (42%), and DeepSeek (33%).

Graph 1
Use of AI tools in the Galician Parliament



Among the reasons that determine the preference for one tool over another, there is no single reason that prevails over the rest. The most important reasons include being the only one known, offering the most professional results tailored to what is needed, offering the most reliable results, citing the sources from which the information is obtained, and the ease of interacting in a specific language, particularly Galician. The latter point is given special importance and generates broad consensus (9.25 out of 10) in support of the Galician government allocating resources to ensure that all these generative AI tools are usable in Galician.

In terms of frequency of use, the majority (83%) use AI several times a month, while 17% do so several times a year; no one claims to use it daily, or even several times a week. Both ChatGPT and other tools mentioned are used for a wide variety of tasks: from drafting proposals, preparing speeches, and generating content for social media (including memes), to formulating responses on the spot during debates or preparing statements for the media.

As for the reasons why AI is not used regularly or, even when it is used, why there is a reluctance to use it more regularly, most members of the parliament highlight three: fear of the reliability of the results provided by tools such as ChatGPT (67%) and insecurity due to lack of training or knowledge about how to use it (66%); moral or ethical reasons also stand out (25%).

Graph 2
Barriers to the use of generative AI tools in parliamentary work



Regarding the lack of specific training, it is striking that 75% of parliamentarians have never received training in AI.

Out of the 25% who have received training at some point, 17% sought it out on their own, while 8% were provided with it by various institutions; however, none report having received this type of training from either the Galician Parliament or their own political party. It is therefore not surprising that 92% of MPs call for training in the use of artificial intelligence applied to their work: 50% believe that their political party should provide it, and 33% believe that this responsibility should fall to the Galician Parliament.

Similarly, almost all (92%) say that no entity or institution, and in particular the Galician chamber, provides them with access to these tools. On the other hand, 67% would like this to be the case, divided between those who believe that Parliament should guarantee access to paid or professional versions—for example, ChatGPT—(33%) and those who believe that this task should be undertaken by their political party (25%).

It is also interesting to note the positive or negative perception that members of parliament have of this technology as an opportunity to improve their parliamentary work, rating this aspect with an average score of 6.6 out of 10,

which is relatively positive. On the other hand, when asked about the relationship between AI and disinformation, most believe that the two phenomena are related, giving this relationship a weighting of 7.8 out of 10. This is why most respondents (75%) are in favor of the European Union and Member States allocating resources to develop their own generative AI tools, separate from those promoted by the United States and China.

Even so, parliamentarians give the results of the AI tools they use a reliability rating of 5.4 out of 10, compared to 6.9 for data provided when searching on Google and a low 5.7 for data obtained through traditional media.

Graph 3
Perception of the reliability (out of 10) of data obtained from different sources for parliamentary work



Analysis of the probability of AI-generated text in parliamentary initiatives

As indicated in the methodology section, a sample of various parliamentary initiatives from different political groups was selected. This sample was analyzed using ChatGPT and GPTZero, software recommended by ChatGPT itself and by various specialized publications (Fernández, 2025), in order to

detect the probability that a text—or parts of it—had been generated by artificial intelligence.

Graph 4

Probabilities of AI-generated text in parliamentary group initiatives, according to ChatGPT and GPTZero



As seen, the results offered by both tools for the analysis of the same texts are completely different, which highlights the difficulties of detecting AI-generated text and the poor reliability of the tools currently available. The cases of the PP and the BNG are striking. In the first case, GPTZero attributes a percentage of human creation of 92% and ChatGPT lowers it to 50%, calculating a 40% probability of mixed generation between AI and humans. In the second case, GPTZero provides absolute certainty (100%) of exclusively human generation, while ChatGPT provides only 60%.

The only reliable result that can be drawn from this analysis is the one in which both tools agree, albeit with nuances: the low percentage of probability they attribute to all parties relying solely on AI. This reinforces the idea of the probable use of ChatGPT and other tools as support for the search for raw material or as a basis for the preparation of texts which, based on what is generated by AI, are subsequently complemented, nuanced, and enriched

by a person, giving them coherence and meaning. This interpretation also corresponds to the results obtained in the online form sent to the deputies.

It is interesting to note the aspects that ChatGPT recognizes as analyzing to try to determine the presence of AI in a text, among which the following stand out: human errors and rhetorical formulations, technical and legal complexity, political-partisan style, political and territorial specificity, etc.

It should be noted, however, that GPTZero warns when scanning the analyzed texts that it is still perfecting its learning of Galician, so "the results may be imperfect." This is not the case with ChatGPT, which is already recognized as being quite trained and competent in this language, although it claims to have some limitations in capturing nuances due to the smaller volume of documentation it has in Galician compared to other languages.

Presence of misinformation in the analyzed texts

To calculate the presence of misinformation in the sample of parliamentary initiatives analyzed, given the nature of this work and current trends in verification (Cuartielles *et al.,* 2023), an analysis was performed using ChatGPT (paid version from the University of Vigo), which works with an estimated scale of five levels of misinformation.

Table 2
ChatGPT estimation scale for calculating the level of disinformation

Level	Description
0	No misinformation. Accurate, complete, and contextualized information.
1	Some slight bias or lack of context, but no falsehoods.
2	Biased or incomplete information with a risk of misinterpretation.
3	Significant misinformation (deception, dubious data, or misrepresentation).
4	High misinformation: clear manipulation, falsehoods, or conspiracies.

Note. ChatGPT.

ChatGPT's conclusion is that none of the parliamentary texts analyzed contain serious or deliberate misinformation (levels 3 or 4). All show clear

political bias, as is natural in parliamentary contexts, but remain within the bounds of legitimate and verified discourse.

This result offered by ChatGPT would be consistent with what was pointed out in the previous section, since, to the extent that there is no high percentage of text generation exclusively with AI—an important source of disinformation, as noted in the theoretical framework—it would be expected that the level of disinformation would be low. It is true that humans, without the assistance of artificial intelligence, can also be generators of disinformation, but previous studies on Galician regional politics have already revealed low levels of disinformation in the discourse of the main political parties (Puentes-Rivera and Fontenla-Pedreira, 2024).

Conclusions and discussion

The general hypothesis of this study is that generative AI, such as ChatGPT or DeepSeek, has already become a common tool in parliaments and political communication offices around the world. By extrapolation and based on the results obtained in this study, with the limitations inherent to its exploratory nature and the representativeness of the sample obtained, it is understood that in the Galician Parliament, the political groups of the Popular Party (PP), the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), Partido dos Socialistas de Galicia-PSOE (PSdeG-PSOE), and the Mixed Group (currently composed of the sole representative of Democracia Ourensana) regularly use this technology as a basis for drafting texts (questions, oral interventions, press releases, etc.) and various administrative tasks.

Although there are still no specific studies on Galicia, the global trend observed in international parliaments, the proven persuasiveness of AI in public debates, and the growing adoption of these tools by political parties in campaigns and communication offices constitute a plausible theoretical framework for transferring this hypothesis to the Galician case. Academic evidence on the expansion of ChatGPT use, the presence of political biases, algorithmic persuasion, and the institutional incorporation of generative AI in political communication strongly supports the hypothesis that parliaments—including Galicia's—are integrating this technology as a regular tool in their daily discourse and practice. This hypothesis is further confirmed by the responses provided by members of parliament regarding the use of AI in their daily work.

Likewise, the institutional Declaration in favor of ethical and human-centered development in Galicia (Parlamento de Galicia, 2022) and the unanimous approval of Law 2/2025, of April 2, for the development and promotion of artificial intelligence in Galicia, show that parliamentary groups (PP, BNG, PSdeG-PSOE, and DO) are committed to principles of ethics, reliability, responsibility, and citizen-oriented use of AI. This framework, although regulatory in nature, also suggests an environment that is conscious of automation processes, even in tasks such as speech writing or internal consultation management.

It should also be noted, by way of more specific conclusions, that:

- ChatGPT is clearly the most widely used AI tool in parliamentary work, practically the only one, and it is striking that no one uses DeepSeek on a regular basis, which shows that, despite the media coverage of its launch, it is American technology and not Chinese technology that is the only one present.
- Pioneering regional legislation shows that Galicia is actively positioning itself for the institutional adoption of AI. Although it is necessary to look more closely at the use of ChatGPT by members of parliament, the legal environment already favors its formal and regulated adoption.
- The existence of specific academic work on ChatGPT and political discourse in Galicia, such as this study promoted by the University of Vigo, confirms that the subject is already being studied locally, supporting the hypothesis of a research and preventive use of AI.
- The university also seems to be the appropriate setting to fill a gap and fulfill a desire expressed by virtually all members of the Galician Parliament: to receive specific and professional training in the use of AI and its application to parliamentary activity. This represents both an opportunity and a challenge for the university itself.
- Regardless of the personal wishes of members of parliament, this high-quality training linked to universities and other leading institutions is also key to democratic quality, as it will ensure that parliamentarians use AI professionally in their work, beyond the everyday use that the general public may make of it.
- Citizen education and awareness, promoted by the Regional Government of Galicia and the Spanish Government through programs such

as AulaCheck, reinforce the fact that Galician society and its institutions consider digital literacy to be important in the face of the potential risks of AI being misused.

- The participation of all parliamentary groups (PP, BNG, PSdeG-PSOE, and DO) in the 2022 joint declaration on ethical AI and the fact that none of them voted against the Law for the Development and Promotion of Artificial Intelligence in Galicia suggests consensus, at least discursive and ethical, among the different groups in the Galician legislative assembly on the need for supervision and quality in the use of automated parliamentary drafting tools, creating a favorable context for the future adoption of specific regulations on the use of generative AI in institutional and political communication in Galicia and its applications in the work of groups and members of the Galician Parliament.

All of this points to a state of opinion in which AI generates concern and internal and public reflection, combined with the perception of obvious benefits in its application as an assistance tool in daily work.

Thus, even without previous research published in indexed journals, the formal context reinforces the main hypothesis of a conscious institutional adoption of the use of artificial intelligence in different tasks related to parliamentary political action.

In conclusion, both qualitative and quantitative evidence reinforce the hypothesis that members of the Galician Parliament, from all political groups, are adopting generative AI, such as ChatGPT, in their daily work, as institutional discourse, regional legislation, and the responses of the deputies themselves to the questionnaire sent to them reflect an information ecosystem compatible with its regulated and thoughtful use, within ethical standards compatible with ideological and political pluralism, using these tools simply as an initial basis for the drafting and preparation of different documents, speeches, and other materials, which are always refined and finalized with human intervention. Therefore, no perverse use of AI has been detected, such as the drafting of texts based exclusively on it, but rather a rational and intelligent use, conceived as a technology to support and assist parliamentary work.

For future research, it would be advisable to conduct semi-structured interviews with members of the Galician Parliament, going beyond the online questionnaire and allowing for a more detailed understanding of their mo-

tivations and intentions, also incorporating into the study parliamentary assistants and communication offices, who are often responsible for drafting texts, speeches, etc. which the deputies then use in public.

It would also be possible to carry out an automated content analysis of social media posts from official or private accounts of Galician parliamentarians to identify typical AI patterns, such as extreme consistency, repetitive style, absence of typographical errors, etc., since their activity on social media determines a large part of their influence on public opinion.

Finally, it would also be advisable to extend the research to other regional parliaments and the Spanish Parliament, in order to then carry out a comparative study and obtain a complete picture of the use and applications of generative AI in Spanish parliamentarianism; in addition to using more representative samples that allow us to transcend the exploratory nature of this study and complete the analysis of disinformation and the use of AI with human control in a qualitative manner, rather than relying solely on AI itself, in order to avoid a circle in which AI itself determines the use or non-use of AI.

Research support and funding

Entity: Xunta de Galicia
Country: Spain
City: Pontevedra
Subsidized project: Not included in anonymized version
Project code: Not included in anonymized version

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Declaration of Authorship - CRediT Taxonomy	
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Iván Puentes-Rivera	Conceptualization, original draft writing, formal analysis, research, methodology, software.
Ana-Belén Fernández-Souto	Funding acquisition, resources, supervision, writing: review and editing, data curation.
Montse Vázquez-Gestal	Project administration, validation, drafting of the original manuscript.

Declaration on the Use of Artificial Intelligence
The authors **DECLARE** that in the preparation of the article entitled ***Disinformation and artificial intelligence in political discourse: use of generative AI in the Parliament of Galicia (Spain),*** AI was used in the drafting of the theoretical framework and results. ChatGPT was used to compare the results of this software with those observed by the authors and to improve knowledge of the subject under study, together with the quality of the conclusions. Specifically, the paid version of ChatGPT offered by the University of Vigo to its research staff (ChatGPT Plus 5) was used to obtain a more comprehensive review of the main references related to the subject of study, which were subsequently subjected to a process of review and verification by the authors. The same software was used to compare the level of disinformation present in the parliamentary texts under investigation.