

# HERMENEUTICS AND TECHNOLOGY

## AS A SALVIFIC DIALOGUE FOR CURRENT PEDAGOGY

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### Hermenéutica y tecnología

### como un diálogo salvífico para la pedagogía actual

LEOPOLDO TILLERÍA-AQUEVEQUE\*

Universidad Bernardo O'Higgins (UBO), Santiago de Chile, Chile

Universidad Tecnológica de Chile INACAP, Temuco, Chile

[leopoldo.tilleria@inacapmail.cl](mailto:leopoldo.tilleria@inacapmail.cl)

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5630-7552>

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#### Abstract

The paper puts forward the controversial thesis that the dialogue between hermeneutics and technology is decisive to safeguard an original pedagogy for a free and responsible citizen. To this end, it uses Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity as an interpretative structure that reorders the meaning of the notions of technique and technology hitherto hidden in tradition. It is suggested that the original relationship between hermeneutics and technology would reveal itself as a salvific relationship for a pedagogy centered not on how to instruct the citizen as to what he should or should not know, but on the primitive and most authentic way of understanding himself. A more proper consideration of the connection between technology and pedagogy, if it is to be effectively based on a philosophical hermeneutics such as the Heideggerian one, should be able to execute what could be called a "hermeneutic shift", i.e., it would be the phenomenological relationship of the human being with technology that would determine the scope, directionality, and relevance of any educational approach. Inopportunately, it wonders whether it could be Plato who shed light on Heidegger's uncovering task of inverting the poles between technology and the world, and, by the same token, determined a hermeneutics of facticity in which poetic uncovering would pave the way towards a salvific pedagogy of the original thought.

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#### Keywords

Understanding, interpretation, pedagogy, being, technique, technology.

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\* Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad de Chile, ha publicado decenas de artículos de filosofía en diversas revistas especializadas de Chile, Ecuador, Perú, Argentina, España, Costa Rica, México, Brasil, Colombia, Venezuela y Paraguay. Sus principales líneas de investigación son la Estética, la Ontología Contemporánea y la Filosofía de la Tecnología.

### Resumen

El escrito plantea la controversial tesis de que el diálogo entre hermenéutica y tecnología resulta decisivo para salvaguardar una pedagogía originaria y al servicio de un ciudadano libre y responsable. Para ello, se vale de la hermenéutica de la facticidad de Heidegger, como una estructura interpretativa que reordena el sentido de las nociones de técnica y tecnología hasta ahora oculto en la tradición. Se sugiere que la relación originaria entre hermenéutica y tecnología se revelaría como una relación salvífica para una pedagogía centrada no el modo de instruir al ciudadano respecto de lo que debe o no debe saber, sino en la forma primitiva y más auténtica de comprenderse a sí mismo. Una consideración más propia de la conexión entre tecnología y pedagogía, si ha de fundarse efectivamente en una hermenéutica filosófica como la heideggeriana, debiese poder ejecutar lo que pudiera llamarse “giro hermenéutico”; es decir, sería la relación fenomenológica del ser humano con la tecnología lo que determinaría el alcance, la direccionalidad y la pertinencia de cualquier enfoque educativo. Inopinadamente, se interroga si pudo ser Platón quien arrojó luz a la tarea desocultante de Heidegger de invertir los polos entre tecnología y mundo, y, por lo mismo, determinó una hermenéutica de la facticidad en la que el desocultamiento poético allanase el camino hacia una pedagogía salvífica del pensar originario.

### Palabras clave

Comprensión, interpretación, pedagogía, ser, técnica, tecnología.

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## Introduction

It may be wrong to say that pedagogy is a problem that has emerged as a socially visible or relevant issue only in the contemporary era, not even in the Renaissance, a period when the arts and sciences seem to want to recover a part of their lost selves in a hell promoted by medieval theocentrism.

Plato—particularly in the *Menon*, but also in the *Protagoras* and in *The Republic*—poses the fundamental question about pedagogy and its moral and political performances. However, the concern of Socrates disciple does not seem to be the pedagogical method itself in these dialogues, or the technique that should lead the teaching of a certain knowledge, but simply the answer to the question about whether or not it is possible to teach virtue, that kind of divine electron that made the Greeks deviate. So, indirectly, what Plato does is, whether he wants to or not, to scrutinize the myth about whether or not virtuous action can be learned theoretically or by practice, or whether, on the contrary, it is not at all teachable, and therefore would be nothing more and nothing less than a gift from the gods.

Plato himself, as for Socrates, must be allowed to give the answer in the dialogue he holds with a doubtful Menon:

[...] virtue would not be given by nature and it is not taught, but it results from a divine gift. Those who receive are not aware of it, unless, among political men, there is one capable of turning others as politicians (*Men.* 99e-100a).

What should be understood from Plato's final reasoning at the near end of the dialogue? In the interpretation of this work and putting the conclusion of the Platonic Socrates into metaphysical context, nothing more than the idea that virtue does not constitute a teachable matter (by way of concept, technique or practice) ... unless a kind of potter of behavior emerges in the city with the capacity to make other men virtuous.

In Plato's words, that capable man is the politician, the sage of the city who possesses the technique of emerging the virtue of the common and crude man, who is no more and no less than the teacher. Thus, the Platonic argument about the possibility of forging virtue in men as a social and political practice—surely the most prevalent of all—is subordinated to a strange way of understanding pedagogy, one that, to paraphrase the philosopher of the Academy, essentially requires a relationship of mutual comprehensibility between the “politicians” and the “aspiring politician.”

Taking the idea to the contemporary era, it could be surmised that this political-pedagogical dimension that guarantees a minimum clarity about the world between educator and educator, or between philosopher and disciple, or between politician and aspirant, in short, between common human beings, seems to be hermeneutics, in particular, the hermeneutics as Heidegger understands it (2002), i.e., as a phenomenology of *Dasein*, and, in this sense, as the original task of the interpretation of the original (p. 60). This connection of Plato's observation on pedagogy -as a method that forges virtue- with the need to guarantee a minimum comprehensibility between men who will put into practice such a virtuous phenomenon, i.e., with the hermeneutics itself, is encountered in the present times, however, with a spur that usually transforms into an ontological barrier almost indestructible, as lucidly expressed by Heidegger himself in *The Question concerning Technology* (1954).

Such a spur is none other than technology.

This work, based on brief philosophical research that has attempted to unravel the still current question about the relationship between technology and pedagogy, is framed in the necessary thematization of education as one of the essential aspects of human knowledge. The method that has been used has turned out to be the same hermeneutics, which in one way or another has become the object of inquiry itself. Specifically, the article aims to discuss in what sense Heidegger's hermeneutics could be considered an effective way of elucidating a pedagogically authentic role of technology, suggesting as a main hypothesis that the metaphysical dialogue between hermeneutics and technology could constitute an urgent response to the challenges of current pedagogy.



Firstly, the sense of hermeneutics in Fribourg view will be addressed and how this method would allow to speak effectively of a connection with technology. Next, we will discuss the hypothesis -secondary in this paper- of whether technology could be understood as a bastard of pedagogy. The last section will develop more extensively the idea that Heideggerian hermeneutics and technology require a dialogue that could be called salvific for contemporary pedagogy, i.e., a dialogue frankly inexcusable.

## Heidegger's hermeneutics and his technological occupation

The project of *Being and Time* (1927), the fundamental work of the young Heidegger, is far from a text on modern technology. The German thinker has said that it is a work that traces an endless question that is confused with the beginning of the thought of the Greek man. It contains the fundamental question that human beings could come to ask themselves: the question of being, in particular, the question of being of man.

However, this radical interrogation of the existence of man — it must be added, in the world — seems to act as a precondition for the explanation of practically all the questions that human beings may come to ask in their relationship to things.

The *Dasein*, therefore, not only questions himself and his self, but, very carefully, questions himself at the same time for his mysterious relationship with the rest of the things (objects, tools, artifacts) of the world. This epistemic attack of *Dasein*, according to Heidegger, will only be possible through a hermeneutics [*Hermeneutik*] that in no case should be understood as that interpretation [*Auslegung*] that merely takes knowledge of the understood, but, quite the contrary, as the assessment of the possibilities projected in the own understanding (León, 2009, p. 272).

What must be understood, with the Heidegger of *ST*, is that the *Dasein*, i.e., the human being that contains in his being a relationship of being with his being, has as existential mission to come to understand himself from his own existence. And this existence, always carried on in a world populated by intermundane entities and other *Dasein*, can only be a scattered existence in the middle of the technique, from where the *Dasein*, who struggles for his own understanding [*Verstehen*] in his character of one more of the entities of the world, shows himself as incapable of ceasing to be such an other than one of *the world*, without avoiding his ontological proximity with the technical artifacts in his existential modality of being-in-the-world. The *Dasein*, then, moves unflinchingly in the middle of the technical body.



However, the pivotal thing here is that this irreversibly being, in the middle of the technical environment, forces *Dasein* not to a theoretical or merely logical type reflection on this technique, but a kind of pragmatic onslaught that requires a certain finalist orientation in the framework of this intermundane perspective, or, as mentioned by Messkirch, based on the way of being of the occupation [*Besorgen*].

The *Dasein* interprets the world as a technical action and not as a pure reflective theoretical act. It is therefore a question of the pragmatization of a very special worldly hermeneutics which, in the end, will allow *Dasein* to determine the world itself as his particular factual way of life. This understanding is hermeneutic because the touchstone of the ontological consideration of this observation of *Dasein* corresponds to his walk along the delicate line that separates a proper act from an improper one.

Indeed, *Dasein* develops his relationship with the world's entities from his search for a state of property that has eluded him since his first vital impulse. As León (2009) says:

When the object does not fit the mental mold, then, what is required is to choose another mold that makes correction, i.e., the right understanding of the object. It could be said that the task of understanding is always hermeneutic in the sense that it presupposes in all cases a *Vorhabe*, a prior knowledge, a pattern acquired in advance of the act of knowledge (p. 272).

Thus, the operation of the *Dasein* could be interpreted as a certain self-discovery. If the *Dasein* has reached this state of impropriety in an ultranatural way, i.e., from his state of ontological alienation [*ontologische Verfremdung*] or throwing, or, in other words, immersed in everyday life, the exit of this vital cover-up becomes a difficult task that can only be achieved by taking the decisive step towards the dimension of property, i.e., reconstituting his relationship with the intermundane entities in the original mode of an execution demand. As De la Maza says (2005):

The common thread of the hermeneutic view is what Heidegger calls "formal indication" (*formale Anzeige*) [...]. Formal indication is a concept that does not have a material content. How you refer to something is not determined by a set of ontic features of the thing you designate. It is not a concept capable of being filled by the presence of the thought object by an intuition, according to Husserl's terminology. But it also does not mean complete emptiness [...]. It is only intelligible in the behaviors by which it is exercised. In the formal indication, there is a call to exercise the concept as a condition of the hermeneutic process of interpretation or of making explicit the possible content (p. 126).

This means that Heideggerian hermeneutics would act virtually as an epistemic funnel, in the sense that the ontological direction by which the world is looked at and in which the entities that aspire to be put in such a look are defined through it. If a metaphor were to be made with respect to this hermeneutics of facticity, the kaleidoscope figure would seem the most accurate.

The young Heidegger will designate *Dasein's* interpretation of his own mobility in the world, in principle, as an interpretation centered on his downfall. It would be a movement oriented to glimpse the alienation that affects himself, and that, therefore, only leaves him in a possible original self-understanding. As suggested by Bedoya (2014), this categorical determination, which Heidegger calls *ruin*, is presented as a cardinal determination in the explicit conception of life:

However, for Heidegger, this ruinous movement, articulated in its own sense, is specifically, despite its declared relevance, only a categorical moment of [...] facticity. With this, the interpretation of the ruin that has been sketched throughout these pages presents an ambiguous character [...], since, although this is an inevitable way of concealment, according to the young teacher of Freiburg, it may be capable of an overcoming that to some extent depends on living one's own life (p. 106).

It is useful to recover the Heidegger's analysis regarding *Dasein* as the fundamental entity that originally implies his being-in-the-world. Indeed, in the lessons of the winter of 1929/1930, known as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (FCM), and without abandoning the notion of *Dasein* as the entity that is determined by the structure of *care*, i.e., as a *Dasein* occupied of an anticipate, being-already, and in-between, Heidegger proposes to develop an analytical of the *Dasein* anchored in something similar to a regional ontology.

The German philosopher is concerned to clarify how occupation, as a cardinal phenomenon of *Dasein*, could become radically conditioned by an ontology lacking the vitalist impulse that determines the very existence [*Existenz*] of *Dasein*. In ST Heidegger (2002) he said that: "Being-in-the-world essentially cared for, [...] it has been possible to conceive as *occupation* [*Besorgen*] being in the middle of the mind at hand, and as *request* [to be] with others, as coexistence appearing in the world" (p. 214). In spite of this ontological threat to *Dasein's* phenomenology that would be a characterization of this being-in-the-world centered on a certain phenomenology of the artificial, or, of the machine or of the pure technology, Heidegger will not renounce a philosophy of the world as a whole.

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In other words, what the philosopher of the Black Forest does by means of this hermeneutics of facticity is to provide *Dasein* with a solid argumentative formulation that, passing through a kind of ontological filter determined by the role of the useful (of the machine, of the technique or of the technology) in his mundane relationship with *Dasein*, corroborates not only the idea of the structure of care as the whole constitution of *Dasein*, but, in a very special way, that this idea to the possible artificial paths of the world of the *Dasein* implies paradoxically the staging from the hermeneutics of facticity itself.

This is what León (2009) refers to with the idea of original cover:

Heidegger argues that hermeneutic of self-interpretation is essentially determined by the fact that factual life is given in a distorted way, as it is always covering itself up. This cover is as original as the news that the original life has of itself. It is not an absolute cover-up, but a kind of disfigurement. That is what makes understanding possible. The problem with hermeneutics is to find an interpretation that dissolves this original cover. The hermeneutics of facticity begins by questioning hermeneutics to understand the being of the factual life (pp. 274-275).



What Heidegger has done in this first stage of his philosophical meditation -long before his radical and original question about technique-, is nothing other than to hermeneutically glimpse a threatening horizon in which *Dasein* could be capped, limited or condemned by the ontic conditions of his existence under reality.

This clarification has come precisely from the research of the *FCMs*, in whose notion of machine design seems to have been embodied. The technical world and the technological world to which *Dasein* is confronted, and which years later Heidegger will call *Gestell*, can be glimpsed in the proto-organic clarity of the phenomenon of the artificial. And this is not surprising, since in the same *ST* the philosopher already warned about this ontological imposition [*ontologische Zumutung*] coming from the very nature of *Dasein*:

Substantiality becomes the fundamental determination of being. Corresponding to this shift in the understanding of being, also the ontological understanding of *Dasein* enters the horizon of this concept of being. The *Dasein*, like any other entity, is also *really there* (Heidegger, 2002, p. 222).

Such technical-technological closeness requires a framework of a place in which the possible pragmatic relevance of the encounter between *Dasein* and this complexity of techniques and technologies (which is be-

fore the circumspective view) is determined in its own way, not by a spatial dimensionality, but necessarily by the phenomenon of occupation, i.e., by the forefront of the ontological experience of the property [*Eigentlichkeit*] of *Dasein*. This is, as effectiveness [*Faktizität*] of existence. As López (2021) envisioned: “Heidegger’s is not linked to a return to a supposed pre-technological natural life, but rather to find an authentic way to inhabit the world” (p. 151). This means that he has decided to transform the original sense of hermeneutic activity. This will no longer be conceived as a mere technique or art of interpreting texts, but as the heart of existing.

Flórez states (2005) about this conceptual movement of Heidegger:

[...] the path of hermeneutics is charted by understanding. With Heidegger comprehension ceases to be an accessory method to understand what appears obscure in the first moment, and becomes the fundamental characteristic of being-in-the-world. The task of epistemological legitimation of the sciences of the spirit, which once constituted the central point of hermeneutical reflection, is taken to the background with the conception of temporality as a fundamental feature of *Dasein* (p. 117).

As for Heidegger, it could not be otherwise. It should be remembered that *being Dasein* the entity that translates the very facticity of life, or more acutely, “[...] what is only in his Day and precisely in it; in his “there” every time, today” (Bercian, 1992, p. 437), the Heideggerian research, if it really seeks to understand the sphere of the experience in its intentional character, cannot replicate the circular deductive method of the tradition, not even the phenomenological model of its master Husserl.

The hermeneutics of Heidegger’s facticity must be a method characterized by the same existential determinations that affect the phenomenology of *Dasein*, pretending, as the German thinker states, that the method of unveiling the ontology of *Dasein* must be driven by the very way of being of this interpretation.

Ledesma (2021) says:

Phenomenology shows that life not only unfolds in the form of an intuition of real objects (perception), imaginaries (fantasy), ideals (judgment), etc., but also, as Husserl showed, in the form of intuitions of the categories of such objects [*kategoriale Anschauung*] and, as Heidegger adds, in the way of an intuition of the sense of the relationship between life and objectivity (lived / experienced) and of life with itself, in other words, in the way of an intuition of the sense reflected in the experience, intuition that he calls *hermeneutic intuition* [] [*hermeneutische Intuition*] (p. 247).





Another way to understand this intricate maneuver of *Dasein* is to corroborate that he understands only what he has already understood, resulting in a necessary circularity, since understanding himself is essential to *Dasein*, i.e., manifests itself as an existential structure of the being of the “there” [Da] (Pole, 2001, p. 82).

This radically interpretative activity of *Dasein*, shown by *ST*'s analytics, questions the continuity that the Teutonic philosopher will impress upon what could be understood as a certain phenomenology of the technique, a dimension strangely not discussed by the scholars of the young Heidegger. Moreover, all the totalizing meditation regarding the reaches, threats and impacts of the *Gestell*, are justified ontologically due to this kind of clivage in the hermeneutics of facticity, which represents the possibility of a distorted apprehension of the horizon of the *Dasein*. In this regards, León (2009) will propose:

Heidegger argues that the hermeneutic movement of self-interpretation is essentially determined by the fact that factual life is given in a distorted way, as it is always covering itself up. [...] It is not an absolute cover, but a kind of disfigurement. [...] The problem of hermeneutics is to find an interpretation that dissolves this original cover (pp. 274-275).

The philosopher Rivero Weber (2001) proposes, in terms of interpreting the world hermeneutically would be in Heidegger nothing more and nothing less than having a certain intimacy with him: “*We understand* it by the mere fact of being in the world: *we understand* why our way of being in the world, our stay in the world, consists in that: in understanding the world in which we live in a pre-theoretical way” (p. 91).

It was just stated that the path towards absolute analysis of the *Gestell* was possible only to the extent that Heidegger's hermeneutics had a new way of seeing, understanding and being in the world. The argument, of course, is ontological, and has to do with the way in which this danger, which will finally represent in the late Heidegger the essence of the technique (in its much-discussed sentence), paradoxically adopts, in accordance with the ontological attributes of *Dasein*, a unitary structure of “being in the world”. It follows that what is new in Heidegger “[...] consists in seeing the being that we are as a being that is already in a basic ontological connection with the world, which guarantees a certain epistemological contact with it” (Rivero Weber, 2001, p. 92).

Thus, hermeneutic analysis will literally transform not only the way of being in the world of *Dasein*, but above all its way of knowing it. It is forced to live with the technical-technological determinations of

Globalization. Such an idea of overcoming the technical-technological is designated by Heidegger as *Gestell*, a sort of structuring mentality—it would be better said, claustrophobic—that does not allow *Dasein* to be free in the way of accessing the originality of being. The understanding of the world as *Gestell* limits it, defines it precisely in its technological potentialities [*technologisches Potenzial*]. Indeed:

What the device does is to make the machine do things [...] it is a system that is prepared to generate certain responses to certain inputs. This relationship between inputs and outputs is based on disposition. But, in turn, the device also disposes us to establish one and only one concrete relationship with it (Luna Alcoba, 2003, p. 60).

So the *Gestell*, i.e., the panorama of a world automated by calculating forces, turns out to be the essence of the technique. What remains now is to determine in what sense such a technical-technological structure could be considered a god or a demon. This ontotheological ambivalence seems to have an answer in the notion of bastard.

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## Technology as a pedagogical bastard

If understanding technology, within the numerous possible definitions, as the science of the artificial, i.e., as a product of the human being devised with the intention of acting in his reality and modifying it according to his needs and interests (García-Córdoba, 2010, p. 16), then an approach that conceives technology as a device subordinated to a certain pedagogical approach will be naive.

What must be demystified is the version that establishes, very in relation to the challenges, problems and impacts caused by COVID-19 in educational structures worldwide, that pedagogical strategies succeeded or failed according to the way the technology was implemented in their respective platforms or repositories, beyond the approach or educational model it had occurred.

If going back to Heidegger, but particularly his perspective of the technical-technological mode that *Dasein* faces in modernity -a trace that, as said, is easy to follow in his text *The Question about Technique*—it is difficult to consider what is called technology, according to the secondary hypothesis that titles this section, as a bastard of pedagogy in a more general or even platonic sense. And this, as much as they insist on pointing out, as Amengual (2001) does, that epistemically pedagogy would

correspond to a discipline whose purpose is to specify certain techniques or technologies with a view to the purposes of education:

Undoubtedly, innovative technologies are technological works and as such, they are cognitive systems that give foundation for the construction of physical instruments or tools and for elaborating intellectual processes for using such tools. It is therefore necessary to distinguish physical instruments from knowledge systems that provide the basis for their construction and use (p. 8).

Gómez (2008) goes much further in an anachronistic idea of technology, suggesting the preparation of a kind of technological tool that strengthens or optimizes an orthodox concept of teaching-learning process:

All these assessments [...] demonstrate the need for continuous and permanent training [...] on the support of technological means in the development of their educational activities in which it is necessary to train users of these means [...] (p. 79).

Finally, there are approaches in which technology, as Educational Technology, would form a discipline by itself, practically without borders, neither from the paradigmatic nor from the interdisciplinary point of view, precisely with a view to the role focused on innovation, or at least with an important consideration of this concept so prevalent in universities that interact in the digital age.

This is what can be inferred from Prendes' observation (2018):

[...] the analysis of educational innovation supported by technologies draws us a space for practical application of Educational Technology that has no borders, a context in which Educational Technology supports its practical action and that in recent years appears linked to developments in telematics, computing, digital technologies, and networks. Educational Technology must be seen as an integrating discipline of knowledge that supports real innovation processes with technologies at any level of education and in relation to formal, non-formal and informal contexts (p. 8).

However, a more proper consideration of the connection between technology and pedagogy, if based effectively on a philosophical hermeneutics such as Heideggerian, and not on one of a religious or philological character, should execute what can be called "hermeneutic shift", insofar as it would be the phenomenological relationship of the human being with technology (with the technical or technological use available in the



field of what is immediately at hand) that epistemically seems to determine the scope, directionality and relevance of any educational approach.

Now, if one of the most recognized modern treaties in the field of the philosophy of education is followed, as is the text *Pedagogy* (1803) of Immanuel Kant, it is found in it a true system of education and the way to achieve it. True to his purpose of providing an unrestricted architectural form for each of the problems that bedevil reason (be it this political, historical, practical-moral, religious, aesthetic-teleological, gnoseological or legal), Kant does not hesitate to propose a scheme that encompasses in detail the prescriptions that modern man must apply almost in a catechistic way, certainly under the control of the State and its laws, but above all under the imperative of freedom and individual will.

Such synopsis is as follows:



*A) The general culture of the faculties of the spirit*, different from the special one. It aims at skill and perfection; it does not teach the pupil, but strengthens the faculties of his spirit. It is:

*a) or physical*, within which everything rests in exercise and discipline [...].

*b) or moral*, it is not based on discipline, but on maxims. [...] He must always understand the basis and derivation of acts by the idea of duty.

*(B) The culture of the faculties of the spirit*. To this belongs the culture of the faculties of knowledge, of the senses, of imagination, of memory, of attention and ingenuity, as regards the *lower faculties* of understanding [...] (Kant, 1803, p. 17).

Seen in this way, education would be in Kantian view a mechanism that will allow society to achieve its purpose empirically, to the extent that the whole individual is prepared and fully instructed, even if education constitutes the biggest and most difficult problem that can be proposed to man (Kant, 1803, p. 3). And here comes a question that should be answered, if the idea is to argue that technology could not be the bastard child of pedagogy, simply because from a hermeneutic reception technology, technique or techno-science are, in fact, epistemic devices of universal scope and not artificial applications at the service of a certain educational curriculum.

In fact, and following Kant's position on the idea of pedagogy, it is education itself, contrary to how it could have been assumed, which is defined as a technique and not as that model called to solve dogmatically or politically the cultural problems of a certain society or a part or elite of it. This is how Kant himself put it (1803):

Education is an art, the practice of which has to be perfected for many generations. Each generation, provided with the knowledge of the pre-

vious ones, can constantly carry out an education that develops in a proportional way and according to a purpose [...]. All education is an art, because man's natural dispositions do not develop by themselves (p. 3).

So, the reasonable thing is to go back to Plato. Indeed, if one notices in his comments about the role of pedagogy in the formation of people, it may be noted that both in him and in Kant what it is all about is forging a virtuous citizen - in the words of the Greek philosopher - or a responsible citizen - in the words of the Prussian philosopher. In both, moreover, education is coincidentally considered a *techné*, an art at the service of a higher good, which is none other than the consolidation of a State of good and exemplary citizens.

Virtue or responsibility, then, become from the perspective of both thinkers in the *thélos* of education, of an education that turned into a *techné* model for the rest of the activities that seek to cultivate the mentality of a free and virtuous citizen. Thus, education would be for Plato, and following Ballén (2010), a propaedeutic for the conversion of the human being into a just citizen and fit both to govern and to be governed:

For the Athenian thinker, education is not just any formation but one that prepares man from his earliest childhood for virtue, which makes him eager and loving to become a good citizen, who knows how to govern and be governed with justice (p. 53).

In other words, Plato's education introduces into the human being a higher way of life through the knowledge and practice of virtue, which in its highest degree will correspond to the access to the idea of Good. Good citizenship in the Greek philosopher seems to be rational knowledge of what it means to be a good citizen.

Returning to the perspective of the last Heidegger in relation to the danger that the *Gestell* represents as a "false uncovering" (of being) — or, in the words of Amaya (2015), as a framework with various functionalities that allows ordering, showing, supporting something, being functional, putting order, fitting, gathering various elements (p. 60) — it can be argued that in no way could the world of technology even be housed in the avatars of certain educational models. On the contrary, it is the same concept of education or pedagogy, of that space dedicated to the forging of citizen values in free and contemporary man, who seems to be trapped in this structure of "calculating thinking" (Ulloa, 2018, p. 11).

The following observation by Hernández (2020) is therefore worth considering:

One need only look at various situations in the contemporary world to reaffirm Heidegger's thesis: globalization, education, wars, the flow of information, entertainment, professionalization, advertising, political campaigns, etc., are currently strongly influenced by technology in such a way that an attempt to renounce it would not only be nonsense, but simply impossible (p. 44).

Next, it will be seen that the key that would allow a person to make his way through this technological war would be nothing but the meditative thinking itself glimpsed by Heidegger.

## Hermeneutics of facticity and technology as a possibility of a saving dialogue for current pedagogy

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In his celebrated dialogue *The Republic*, Plato uses the allegory of the cave to illustrate to his disciples what is the technique of education.

As known, this story tells the fierce struggle between *doxa* and *episteme*, between darkness and light, between ignorance and knowledge; finally, between our demons (appearances) and our gods (essences). However, it is wrong to state that the purpose of Plato's Academy was simply the strengthening (gymnastic, rhetorical, musical, logical, mathematical) of those chosen or accepted.

Plato's educational philosophy was starkly political. He had to face the specter of the pseudo-education of the sophists and, therefore, show himself as deeply reforming all those vices that took the citizen of Athens away from other higher ends or, rightly, that brought him closer to an irreversible corruption.

In the Words of Valiente (2015):

Considering education as a transformative and changing instrument of human thought, could have been one of the reasons that led Plato to propose a reform of it in ancient Athens, as the only way for recovering a state in decline and corrupted, supported by democratic ideals that only reflected the division and latent ethical-political disease of its citizens [...]. The Platonic pedagogical model sought is the harmony of the human soul through an ironclad ethical-political education; [...] that acquires the virtue that corresponds to it (p. 42).

This comment goes right to the heart of Plato's pedagogical theory. It highlights the issue of the harmony of the soul in relation to a body that moves amid the problems of the political world. The soul, in this way, would be a kind of rudder that would contrast the rales of the physical

organ, ruled by sensations of the most diverse nature. The compass of this rudder—analogously, the GPS of this plasticity that the soul requires to lead itself along the virtuous road to the *zôion politikón*—can only be pedagogy as a technique, as a master key for accessing human virtues. As Aguilar points out (2011):

[...] it must be said that the ultimate foundation of education and technology lies exclusively in man, since we cannot speak of education, nor of technology without a social historical subject situated in a context in which he thinks, generates, transforms, builds and acts (p. 134).

In the framework of the hermeneutics of facticity, Plato's cave bears remarkable similarities with the calculative structure of the Heideggerian *Gestell*. Although both ideas respond to very different ontological configurations—both coincidentally, with the presence of a divine halo debated to the fullest by commentators—it must be agreed that the possibility of the *Gestell* acting as a kind of technological cave regarding the most authentic decisions of *Dasein* ceases to appear as a simple analogy to become an anticipation of a more primitive and original unveiling.

It seems that only by working hard to get out of the technological cave in which the *Gestell* has cornered him, is it possible that *Dasein* is heading towards an educational action primarily free and responsible, or, more in tune with the truth of the being. Thus Rivero Weber (2001) asserts: "When Heidegger speaks of heeding the call of being, he refers to the fact that we cannot understand what it means to be something - and not simply to be nothing - if we do not stop at certain fundamental questions" (p. 95), i.e., by not dwelling on them, we have come to relate to the world profanely.

In the long run, the technological habitat is not really the world of the artifact or the mere technological entity. The expression "world of technology" has its core in the word "world", in the sense that what defines the path of the *Dasein* or of the man chained in the platonic cave is nothing but the meditative thought capable of unraveling the plot and the threat of the *Gestell*, keeping as anchors the freedom and the light, extremely expensive words to Kant and Plato, as seen.

In this regard, Heidegger himself (1983) says in *The Question of Technique*:

Freedom governs the free in the sense of the enlightened, i.e., of the unconcealed. The event of uncovering, hence, truth, is what is in the closest and intimate kinship with freedom. All unveiling belongs to a shelter and veil (pp. 93-94).

And the similarities follow. In what sense? Not, of course, in the case of making the ontologies or gnoseology of one or the other thinker equivalent, a task incompatible with the very postulates of the hermeneutics of facticity, but resolutely in the case of revealing a dimension of the human being that until now had remained strangely hidden in the event of *Dasein*. This dimension or censorship of contemporary man is, of course, that of duty, or the distressing world of ethics.

A careful reading of *The Republic* allows to realize that Plato's educational intention is none other than that of representing the importance of education for the subsistence of the State. There is something akin to an imperative for the citizen to permanently assess the way of education he is molding his lineage (a good analogy would be that of the blacksmith like Hephaestus). This mandate is to not be carried away by common, by chance or by simple instructional delay. In Heidegger's nomenclature it would be said by the chatter [*Gerede*]. It is stated in *The Republic*:

First and foremost, the god commands the rulers to be nothing so good guardians and nothing so intensely guarded as that metal which is mixed in the composition of the souls of their children [...]. And if any of these [his own sons], in turn, are born with a mixture of gold, or silver, after valuing their value, they shall ascend them among the guardians or the guards, respectively, with the idea that there is an oracle according to which the State shall succumb when guarded by a guardian of iron or bronze (*Rep.* 415 b-c).

Custody, guardian, oracle... Are not these fundamental concepts of *The Question concerning Technology*? Is it not Heidegger himself who provocatively asks the reader about the end of this text with the following sentence: "For this [unveiling] allows man to intuit the highest dignity of his essence and enter it" (Heidegger, 1983, p. 102). And further on: "But what does the glance at the constellation of truth help us? We looked at danger and saw the growth of the savior" (Heidegger, 1983, p. 104).

Although not wishing to platonize Heidegger, it is unacceptable to avoid the interpretative concomitances of both philosophers regarding the final value of a possible hermeneutics of destiny as an unfulfilled path of *Dasein*.

It is not *Dasein's* technological mode, or even his status as a project in the middle of the technological entity that warns of the interpretative confluence between Heidegger and Plato. What matters is to corroborate to what extent a "strong" interpretation of the *Gestell* as a hegemonic mode of technical reason over de-occulting meditation would allow, *noles*





*volens*, to access a possible reception of an essence of the technique beyond mere calculation or mere educative education.

The answer, hopefully connected with the Athenian philosopher, is given by Heidegger (1983) in the last pages of his book on technique: “The poetic brings the true to the brightness of what Plato calls in the ‘Phaedrus’ τὸ ἐκφανέστατον, which more purely shines. The poetic transessence [durch-wessen = transcends] to all art, to all concealment of the present in the beautiful” (p. 106).

Is it possible that the poetic, that which originally Heidegger says, seems to be destined to the salvation of the primitive maneuver of the unconcealment of the being, is also the area in which technology (the *Gestell*’s “death row”) maintains a mysteriously true relationship with the being, and, therefore, with the essence of man?

Could Plato be the thinker who shed light on Heidegger’s unveiling task of reversing the poles between technology and the world, and thereby determined a hermeneutics of facticity in which poetic unveiling paved the way to a saving pedagogy of original thinking?

For now, it is possible to stick to the very possibilities that *Dasein* has provided to unravel his surrounding world, or as Heidegger puts it so precisely in § 32 of *ST*, to refer to the interpretation [*Auslegung*], understood as the possibility of development proper to the project of understanding. Hermeneutically, then, and as Avila observes (2016):

In the original understanding, the *Dasein* “knows” what happens to his power-being and recognizes its possibilities (*ST* §31). “The projective character of understanding constitutes the openness of the there of being-in-the-world as the there of a power-being” (*ST* §31, p. 169). And as soon as he understands, he projects his being towards possibilities (*ST* §32). In this sense, “the *Dasein* can be understood immediately and regularly from his world” (*ST* §26, p.149) (pp. 100-101).

Thus, this immediate understanding of *Dasein* by itself, from his world, is impossible even to conceive without the triple condition of the asking. And, from it, the path from pre-comprehension to comprehension (the original direction of the hermeneutic circle) would reflect nothing but the original path from darkness to light, from the mind to the being of the entity, from the *Gestell* to the unobtrusive thinking.

## Conclusions

- Based on the structure of the hermeneutics of facticity, i.e., in the radical reformulation of ontology carried out by the first Heidegger, a more original understanding of the factual-historical relationship between world and technology is reached. Indeed, it seems that the role that each of these concepts plays in Heidegger's *Lebensphilosophie* makes the *Dasein*'s own world of life turn, in the sense that the technological phenomenon, founded on the ontological tension displayed by the *Gestell*, is imposed not as a pure and simple technological entity, but as a mode of ontological convertibility of the own *Dasein*.
- The fact that the same hermeneutics is revealed as the most obvious way of access to the facticity, shows that the possibilities of phenomenology as ontology could determine the phenomenon of the formation of *Dasein* anchored in its primitive relationship with the *Gestell*, and, destined to the event appropriating the present of truth.
- Pedagogy, as an intrinsically formative act, and based on Plato's reasoning regarding the necessary link that should exist between knowledge, protection, and model in the universal task of training a virtuous citizen, becomes a virtual technique at the service of a free and responsible citizenship.
- Paradigms, approaches or educational models, whatever they may be or pretend to be, must be understood as a sequel to a certain way of being in the world, the one that —the late Heidegger anticipates us— has its prequel in the possible clarification of the essence of the technique in the consciousness of modern man.
- The original relationship between hermeneutics and technology—with an ontological nod to Plato and an epistemic-political nod to Kant—has unexpectedly revealed itself as a saving relationship for a pedagogy centered not on how to instruct the citizen about what he should or should not know, but on the primitive and more authentic way of understanding himself.



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